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This Article illuminates the largely misunderstood relationship
between complexity and the regulation of property interests.
Specifically, the Article presents the "complexity thesis" -a novel
explanatory account of the principle of numerus clausus. The
principle of numerus clausus is an ancient common law rule that
prohibits the customization of property interests. The complexity
thesis holds that the primary function of numerus clausus is to
prevent the proliferation of highly idiosyncratic property interests. In
so doing, numerus clausus provides a bulkhead against the
overwhelming complexity that would ensue if customized property
interests were permitted.
For the last fifteen years, numerus clausus has been the subject of
a spirited colloquy in which property theorists of all methodological
stripes have sought to unravel some of the mysteries that surround
the principle. This Article carefully engages several prominent
explanatory accounts of numerus clausus, and it demonstrates that
while these competing accounts supply a number of important
insights about the principle, the complexity thesis does a better job of
accounting for all of the salient features of the principle without
sacrificing coherence or consilience.
Finally, the complexity thesis is especially instructive today, as
the 2007 collapse of the housing market can largely be traced to a set
of basic misapprehensions about the destructive power of complexity
in the context of highly alienable interests. The complexity thesis
demonstrates that standardization serves an essential epistemic
function. Standardization enables us to better apprehend risk and
thereby avoid catastrophic miscalculations such as those that led to
the housing collapse.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Complexity begets danger.' Or perhaps it is more accurate to say
that existing dangers are more readily hidden within complex
1. Although the term "complexity" can refer to several distinct connotations
and conceptions, it is used here to denote "computational complexity"-a
phenomenon that is measured by the volume of information that must be processed
to draw a given conclusion. See Sanjeev Arora, Boaz Barak, Markus Brunnermeier &
Rong Ge, Computational Complexity and Information Asymmetry in Financial
Products 2 (Princeton Working Paper, Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www.cs.prin
ceton.edu/~rongge/derivative.pdf (applying the concept of computational complexity




situations. In complex situations, the important facts-the very facts
that we need to know to avoid catastrophe-may be quite effectively
hidden in plain sight.2 The essential information is there, it is
available, but there is simply too much information for us to
process.3 An example of this phenomenon frequently arises in the
context of litigation.4 Complexity's obscuring power is often
strategically exploited in the course of discovery.5 Litigants send
many thousands of documents in response to a single RFP,6 forcing
opponents to waste time and money searching for the needle of
relevant information amid a haystack of obscuring (but otherwise
perfectly benign) documents.7 Complexity provides excellent
camouflage, and its destructive capacity is frequently
underestimated.8
Complexity's dark side-its destructive capacity-is often
underestimated, in part, because we are accustomed (or, perhaps,
acculturated) to regarding complexity with varying shades of awe
and admiration.9 Complexity has the propensity to exponentially
expand opportunities and possibilities, which is intuitively
appealing.10 Moreover, complex systems, such as the human body,
are capable of astounding feats." Because much of what we
experience (and even what we are) is inextricably entangled with the
2. See, e.g., Chunlin Leonhard, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the
Economic Checks and Balances, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 15, 16
(2012) ("[Sjecurities were structured in such a complex manner that a proper risk
evaluation was 'difficult, if not impossible."').
3. See Arora et al., supra note 1, at 2 ("Computational complexity studies
intractable problems, those that require more computational resources than can be
provided by the fastest computers on earth put together.").
4. Cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1401 (1994) (addressing the issue of discovery abuse in
litigation).
5. Cf. id. (describing a "common discovery abuse in which corporate
defendants ... inundate requesting plaintiffs with thousands of documents").
6. An RFP is a request for production proffered in accordance with Rule 26 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
7. Mullenix, supra note 4, at 1401 (observing that document inundation
"impos[es] extra cost, harassment, and delay on requesting plaintiffs").
8. See Arora et al., supra note 1, at 1 (noting that complexity provides the
ability to hide information, resulting in "bounded rationality").
9. See generally MITCHELL, supra note 1 (discussing the role of complexity in a
variety of areas, including how the human brain deals with complexity).
10. Id.
11. Cf. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 5-9 (describing the feats accomplished
within the complex systems of the human brain and immune system).
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phenomenon of complexity, we often fail to appreciate complexity's
darker attributes, such as its capacity to inundate and overwhelm
us.12
One of the principle means by which we attempt to grapple with
the complexity of lived human experience is to adopt systems of
rules-including legal rules.13 Laws, insofar as they succeed in
regulating human behavior, provide pockets of potential respite from
the relentless challenges presented by the complexity of human
existence. 14 Indeed, as Ronald Allen states it, "the struggle with
complexity may be one of the most general explanatory features of
the legal system."15 From this perspective, the need to domesticate
complexity may be a progenitor of "law" itself.16
This Article posits that property law, in particular, is uniquely
well-suited to the task of taming complexity. Moreover, the means by
which property law battles complexity is the deceptively simple
principle of numerus clausus. Numerus clausus does only one thing,
but it does it extraordinarily well: it prevents the customization of
property interests.17 In the absence of this simple common law rule,
the normative commitments that comprise our rights and duties
with respect to the tangible objects in the world would rapidly grow
so complex as to overwhelm our capacity to understand them, let
alone enforce them. Thus, numerus clausus is more than just an
ancient and peculiar feature' 8 of our property system-it is also a
necessary and constitutive feature of any normative conception of
property rights.
12. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and the Taming of Complexity, 62
ALA. L REV. 1047, 1048 (2011) (discussing complexity in the context of law).
13. Id. ("[Tihe central, largely unnoticed, challenge of the legal system is to
domesticate complexity. . . .").
14. Id. at 1054 (describing "law" and "fact" as "bubbling cauldrons of interacting
variables too numerous to articulate let alone compute.").
15. Id. at 1048.
16. Id. at 1060 ("A large part of debate over rules and their limits is often
implicitly about the complexity of the relevant domain .... ). For an excellent article
discussing the implications of complexity in the context of legal rules, see Eric Kades,
The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of
Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403 (1997).
17. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) ("A
central difference between contract and property concerns the freedom to 'customize'
legally enforceable interests.").
18. Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of




Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that the principle of numerus
clausus is a cross-cultural, universal feature of property law.19 It is a
feature of property law "that transcends context."20 It appears to be
a feature of every known post-feudal system of property. 21 As Nestor
Davidson observes, there must be a reason "why property interests
almost always coalesce around forms defined by the state."2 2
The principle's universality represents the first of two mysteries
that surround numerus clausus: why do all property systems employ
the same tool of structural restraint when those systems are
otherwise often committed to diverse and conflicting sets of
institutional and distributional principles? 23
A second mystery also surrounds numerus clausus. This mystery
concerns the principle's unique persistence in property law.2 4 As
many scholars have observed, virtually any function that numerus
clausus could be said to serve in the context of property interests
(e.g., lowering transaction costs by simplifying interests or
mediating competing pluralist valueS2 5) could equally be served in
the context of the creation of other legally enforceable interests. 26
Why then does numerus clausus only arise as a principle in property
doctrine?
Unraveling these twin mysteries has proven to be something of a
challenge.27 For the past fifteen years, the principle of numerus
19. Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2008) ("Versions of the numerus clausus are found in
Roman law and recur throughout the history of feudal and post-feudal English
common law. Likewise, some form of a standard list appears in disparate modern
civil law and common law systems throughout the world.").
20. Id.
21. Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus
Problem, in 3 OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 239, 241 (John Eekelaar & John
Bell eds., 1987).
22. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1600.
23. Id. at 1600 (observing that the universality of the principle belays "any
account of the phenomenon grounded in specific patterns of social relations or
normative coherence").
24. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 373, 380 (2002) (faulting an explanatory account of the principle for
failing "to explain why property law is more restrictive than contract law").
25. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 19, at 1600-01 (advancing the theory that
numerus clausus functions to mediate pluralistic values).
26. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24 (suggesting that a
successful explanation for numerus clausus must account for its unique presence in
property law).
27. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 1618 (describing the persistence of numerus
2013] 83
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clausus has been the focus of a rich colloquy in which scholars of
various methodological stripes have sought to address these and
other questions.28 This study has resulted in both illumination and
obfuscation. 29 On the one hand, explanations of the principle now
abound, many of which shed light on important aspects of numerus
clausus.30 On the other hand, our amassed explanations have failed
to account for the most pointed and vexing aspects of the
phenomenon: the universality and unique application of a rule that
appears to hinder efficiency, 31 to thwart autonomy, 32 and, by
conventional accounts, to embody a well-known intellectual error. 33
This Article addresses these mysteries by providing a novel
explanatory account of numerus clausus, described here as "the
complexity thesis." It is important to be clear that the thesis
clausus in property doctrine as a "puzzle" and observing that "standardization has
long proven challenging to predominant accounts of property").
28. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1565
(2003) ("The numerus clausus principle, in other words, sustains the institutions of
property as intermediary social constructs through which law interacts with-
reflects and shapes-our social values."); Davidson, supra note 19 (arguing that the
principle is a means by which property doctrine accommodates competing pluralist
values); Dorfman, supra note 18 (arguing that the principle of numerus clausus
represents a moral commitment to democratic self-government); Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 24, at 373, 382, 416-17 (arguing that standardization in
property serves to "aid verification of the ownership of rights offered for
conveyance"); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J.
1163, 1176-78 (1999) (arguing that numerus clausus functions to prevent the
fragmentation of property interests); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of
Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1730-39
(2003) (advancing the theory that various conceptions of objective well-being serve as
a justification for the numerus clausus principle); Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at
8 (arguing that numerus clausus "stems from the in rem nature of property rights"
and serves to reduce information costs in property transactions); Joseph W. Singer,
Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1009 (2009) (arguing that structural features of property law, like numerus
clausus, are justified or unjustified in light of the degree to which those features
support democratic values).
29. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 1598 (describing property theory as a
"puzzle").
30. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
31. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1599 (observing that numerus clausus appears
to "restrict the autonomy and efficiency gains conventionally associated with private
property").
32. Id.
33. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 6 (stating that "[s]cholars and judges




presented here is offered as an explanation-rather than a
justification-of the principle. Towards that end, the thesis strives to
account for the three most salient aspects of the principle: (1) the
principle's prohibition of novel forms;34 (2) the principle's
universality;35 and (3) the principle's unique application in property
doctrine.36
The complexity thesis accounts for these features by positing
that the primary function of numerus clausus is to eliminate highly
idiosyncratic property interests. 37 The benefit of eliminating
idiosyncratic interests is, at base, epistemic. 38 Standardization
serves to constrain the overall volume of information that we must
process to understand and enforce property interests. 39 In this way,
numerus clausus makes it possible for us to understand our property
interests.
Thus, the complexity thesis supplies an answer to the principle's
twin mysteries of universality40 and uniqueness.41 Numerus clausus
arises as an element of every property system in the world because
the complexity of the task at hand (i.e., organizing our normative
interactions with tangible objects in the world) necessitates it.
Although most human endeavors require us to grapple with
complexity, there are particular ontological features of tangible
objects in the world (and our interactions with those objects) that
render our property practices uniquely vulnerable to complexity's
capacity to overwhelm. 42 The thesis likewise accounts for the
principle's prohibition of novel forms of ownership: customized
property interests are disallowed by numerus clausus as a means of
controlling the volume of information that constitutes our property
34. Id. at 3 ('"[llncidents of a novel kind' cannot 'be devised and attached to
property at the fancy or caprice of any owner."').
35. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1600 ("[S]ome form of a standard list appears in
disparate modern civil law and common law systems throughout the world.").
36. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24 (discussing the need
for an explanation regarding the principle's unique application to property).
37. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 27 (noting a problem resulting
from the ability to create idiosyncratic property rights).
38. See id. at 26 (determining that the inability of individuals to completely
understand the costs of creating new property rights gives rise to the need for
standardization in property).
39. See id. at 8 (concluding that third parties would be burdened by the
creation of unusual property rights as it would be difficult to fully take into account
the costs and various issues associated with such rights).
40. Id. at 4.
41. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 1636.
42. See supra Part I.B.
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interests. 43 In this way, the complexity thesis clarifies questions that
previous theses have left unresolved.44
Thus, the complexity thesis brings consilience and coherence to
an aspect of property law that has long fascinated (and frustrated)
theorists of all stripes. 45 These ideas are presented in the following
format. First, Part I provides an overview of the relationship
between standardization, complexity, and property. Next, Part II
considers prominent alternative explanatory accounts of numerus
clausus and highlights the major critiques of these accounts. Part III
then details the complexity thesis, explaining the principle of
numerus clausus in light of its epistemic function and the ontological
features of property that necessitate it. Finally, Part IV offers a
conclusion.
II. COMPLEXITY IN PROPERTY
Before embarking on the project of detailing the epistemic
function of numerus clausus and ontological features of property
that necessitate the principle, it may prove helpful to first tarry for a
moment on the topic of complexity itself.
"Complexity" is a contested concept.46 There are many ways to
define complexity (e.g., complexity as size, complexity as entropy,
computational complexity, and complexity as hierarchy).47 However,
the term is used here to roughly denote "computational
complexity."48 Computational complexity refers to the amount of
information that one must process in order to reach a conclusion or
resolve an uncertainty. 49 In the context in which the term is applied
here, complexity refers to the amount of information that one must
43. See generally Merrill & Smith, supra 17 (concluding that the
standardization of property interests is necessary to control the cost of being faced
with an overload of information).
44. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 1599 (noting that attempts to explain
standardization have failed to address significant issues).
45. See, e.g., id. (discussing the various positions scholars have taken regarding
standardization).
46. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 94.
47. Id. at 94-111.
48. Cf. Arora et al., supra note 1, at 2 (applying the concept of computational
complexity in the context of complex financial instruments).
49. Id.; see also Kades, supra note 16, at 421 (discussing computational
complexity in the context of applying fixed legal rules to a large number of factual
variables). Kades succinctly explains the role of computational complexity theory in
this context: "[Computational complexity theory] takes the rules as fixed, and




process to draw conclusions about the substantive content of our
duties and obligations with respect to tangible objects in the world.
The central thesis of this piece holds that numerus clausus prevents
our property interests from evolving into such complex entities that
they present a situation of "intractable computational complexity."50
A. The Dark Side of Complexity
When complexity interacts with our property practices, it
becomes a double-edged sword. To a great extent, complexity is the
author of our capacity to conceptualize normative commitments vis-
A-vis tangible objects in the world. Similarly, domesticated
complexity serves as the architect of any system of property that is
sophisticated enough to encourage the efficient use of scarce
resources. Yet complexity in the context of our property practices
exhibits decidedly menacing propensities as well. One can find a
dramatic and instructive example of those propensities amid the
rubble of the 2007 housing market collapse and the ensuing financial
crisis. 51
Although many factors contributed to the financial crisis,52 Most
commentators agree that the proliferation of "opaque" securities,
such as synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), played a
substantial role.53 A CDO is a type of complex derivative whose
50. See Arora et al., supra note 1, at 2 (describing as "intractable" the
computational complexity presented by certain types of financial derivatives).
51. Id. at 1-3 (contending that the computational complexity that resulted from
the structure of complex derivatives was a significant precipitating factor in the
2007-2009 financial crisis); Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval
of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 63, 69 (2012) ("One of the
fundamental causes of that crisis, however, was the unprecedented level of
complexity of financial products and markets. . . .").
52. Arora et al., supra note 1, at 1; Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter,
Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1177 (2012) (observing there to
be "little consensus" as to the causes of the collapse, but largely attributing the
housing market collapse to the "failure of markets to price risk correctly due to the
complexity, opacity, and heterogeneity of the unregulated private-label mortgage-
backed securities"); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime
Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 550 (2009) (observing that "[tihe financial crisis
resulted from a cascade of failures, initially triggered by the historically
unanticipated depth of the fall in housing prices" among other "failures").
53. See, e.g., R. Christopher Whalen, The Subprime Crisis-Cause, Effect and
Consequences, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 219, 220 (2008) at
221 (citing "active encouragement by the SEC and federal bank regulators of the
rapid growth of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and securities by all types of
financial institutions, leading to a breakdown in safety and soundness at banks and
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value is dependent upon the performance of a set of underlying
assets, such as a portfolio of mortgages. 54 At base, a CDO is a
contract.55 It is a type of credit default swap in which the buyer pays
a premium to the seller, and in exchange, the seller promises to pay
the buyer a large lump sum in the event of a default in the
underlying asset.56 In entering the contract, the seller is betting that
the underlying asset will not default, and the buyer is betting that it
will.
In the years leading up to the financial crisis, there existed a
robust, over-the-counter market in CDOs in which the underlying
portfolio of assets included subprime mortgages.57 Assessing the
value and risk of these securities required information about the
likelihood of default in the underlying assets.58 However, the
likelihood of default on any given mortgage is dependent upon a very
large number of variables.5 9 When many different mortgages are
packaged together in a portfolio, the sheer number of relevant
variables prohibits an accurate individual assessment of the risk of
default.60 The time and expense required to cull through each
individual loan and analyze the relevant variables is so high as to
prohibit the credit default swap altogether. 61
Indeed, economists Sanjeev Arora, Boaz Barak, Markus
Brunnermeier, and Rong Ge have argued persuasively that the
proliferation of CDOs presented a problem of intractable
computational complexity, even to banking powerhouses-like
Goldman Sachs-that possessed substantial computational
capacity.62 There were simply too many variables for even the most
highly powered computers to compute within a pragmatically
securities dealers" as a precipitating cause of the crisis).
54. Lynn Stout, Uncertainty, Dangerous Optimism, and Speculation: An
Inquiry into Some Limits of Democratic Governance, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1177,
1184-85 ("Derivatives are literally bets-contractual agreements between two
parties that one will pay the other an amount of money determined by whether or
not some future event occurs.").
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1185.
57. Whalen, supra note 53, at 223.
58. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 52, at 1182 (stating that "serious
informational asymmetries between financial intermediaries and investors" caused
investors to underestimate risk across the class of products).
59. Id. at 1183.
60. Id. at 1183-84.
61. Leonhard, supra note 2, at 16 ("[S]ecurities were structured in such a
complex manner that a proper risk evaluation was 'difficult, if not impossible."').
62. Arora et al., supra note 1, at 1-3.
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reasonable amount of time.63 This intractable computational
complexity led to informational asymmetries that made it impossible
for CDO investors to accurately assess their risk, a circumstance
that ultimately led to the financial crisis.64 Although investors have
adequate access to information about risk, they could not make
profitable use of that information because there was simply too
much of it.65
What was the origin of all this complexity? There are two
reasons why CDOs are such complex entities.66 The first involves the
set of multilayer contingencies that is inherent in a credit default
swap.67 For example, the credit-worthiness of the mortgagor is one
variable, but credit-worthiness itself consists of many variables, such
as credit history, employment information, debt-to-equity ratio, and
even more elusive information regarding the mortgagor's health,
family status, and temperament.68
However, a second-and more significant-set of variables is
introduced into the trading of CDOs as a result of their structural
flexibility.69 CDOs are not standardized. 70 A buyer and seller can
customize the terms of a CDO to fit their specific risk-management
needs. 71 In other words, the parties to the transaction can write their
own novel terms. This flexibility adds a significant layer of
complexity to the trading of these derivatives. 72
As a consequence of this structural flexibility, CDO transactions
are not comparable to one another.73 This means that a CDO's
material terms are not intuitively accessible. 74 One cannot know
what is important to know about a CDO in the way that one can
immediately know what is important to know about, say, a car.7 5
Generally speaking, we are acquainted not only with the limited
menu of variables that are relevant to a car's value but also with the
limited menu of powers and duties that attend car ownership. We
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Omarova, supra note 51, at 72.
67. Id. at 69.
68. Id.
69. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 52, at 1183-84 ("The structure of these
products made them very difficult to gauge, and hence price, their risk accurately.").
70. Omarova, supra note 51, at 69.
71. Id. at 69-70.
72. Id. at 70.
73. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 52, at 1184.




know both what a car is and what it is to own one. This intuitive
understanding is absent in the context of complex derivatives
because important features of a derivative contract are not
generalizable in the same way that important features of a car tend
to be generalizable.
A third source of CDO complexity issues from the structure of
the markets in which CDOs are traded.76 As Saule Omarova has
described it, "[c]omplex structured transactions effectively separate
and repackage ownership, payment, and other rights associated with
the reference assets . . . . As a result of this complexity, opacity,
interconnectedness, and fragmentation, individual financial
institutions lack the ability to measure and analyze . . . the true
level of their own risk exposure."77
Because of their perceived volatility, derivatives such as CDOs
have long enjoyed a rapscallion reputation within the public
imagination.78 Indeed, one monograph on the subject is titled
Derivatives: the Wild Beast of Finance.79 Although there is a certain
degree of theatrics to such a title, there is, too, a degree of aptness.
There is something that might be described as "feral" about complex
derivatives, where "feral" connotes a menacing unpredictability and
its attendant dangers.80 The most important source of "feral-ness"
derives from the fact that it is so difficult to process relevant
information due to the sheer volume of relevant information. In
other words, it is complexity that renders these products feral.a1
Yet perhaps the most interesting thing about derivatives-at
least from the perspective of the thesis advanced here-is that CDOs
are not "property."82 Despite the fact that a CDO is a valuable, fully
alienable entity that is often traded in mass, a CDO is characterized
76. Omarova, supra note 51, at 69-71.
77. Id. at 71.
78. Robert J. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, Derivatives and the Modern Prudent
Investor Rule: Too Risky or Too Necessary? 67 OHIO ST. L. J. 525, 532-33 (2006)
("Derivatives are quite possibly the most controversial of all investments. Indeed,
there are several examples of derivatives devastating investors . . . [which] has
contributed to ... a kind of 'derivaphobia."').
79. ALFRED STEINHERR, DERIVATIVES: THE WILD BEAST OF FINANCE: A PATH
To EFFECTIVE GLOBALIZATION? (2000).
80. See generally id. (discussing the potential risks that complex derivatives
may pose to the global market due to their unpredictability and uncertainty).
81. Omarova, supra note 51, at 70 ("Complex financial instruments are difficult
to understand and value, because their risks are not easily measured and controlled.
This is attributable to the potential complexity of the specific reference assets and
the structure of the transactions.").
82. Stout, supra note 54, at 1184-85.
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as a contract interest rather than a property interest.83 You may be
a party to a CDO, but you cannot be the owner of a CDO.84
Moreover, it is this classification as a "contract" that makes possible
both the extraordinary flexibility and extraordinary complexity of
CDOs.8 5 CDOs are capable of becoming exceedingly complex because
they are not subject to the principle of numerus clausus.
B. Standardization in Property
To illustrate this point, imagine for a moment that we lived in a
world in which customization and its ensuing complexity extended
not only to the purchase of sophisticated financial securities but also
to the purchase of more straightforward and commonplace entities,
such as cars. Imagine that each time a car was purchased, the seller
and the buyer created their own novel terms of ownership. In such a
world, "ownership" might include a byzantine set of powers and
duties, each of which might be contingent upon other underlying
events.
For example, imagine that I "bought" a car from a seller who
wanted to profit from the sale while simultaneously continuing to
use the car occasionally. Imagine that the seller offered to "sell" the
car to me to use at all times-except on the third Sunday of every
month in which the New England Patriots scored a touchdown. On
those dates, the seller may or may not elect to use the car. In the
event that she elects not to use the car on those dates, I, as the
buyer, would owe the seller a fee equivalent to the fair market value
of the use that the seller forewent. Further, to hedge her bet that the
New England Patriots would score sufficient touchdowns such that
she would have adequate access to the car, imagine that the seller
requires that I agree to allow her plenary use of the car for one half
hour a week during the off-season of every year in which the Patriots
failed to make it to the playoffs. Finally, imagine that the seller is
concerned that my future use of the car might impinge upon her
future use of the car-for example, if I used the car excessively,
failed to maintain it, or used it dangerous situations-and thus
mandated that our "ownership" arrangement exclude each of those
uses as well as uses that involve any religious activities (as the seller
is an ethically committed atheist).86
83. Id. at 1184.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Leonhard, supra note 2, at 16.
86. A reader may here sensibly object that this hypothetical arrangement is
allowed by the principle of numerus clausus in the form of a "timeshare." The term
timeshare may refer to one of several legal arrangements, including a lease, a use
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Now imagine that all cars were subject to such customized
ownership agreements. Not only would it be difficult for me to keep
track of the parameters of my powers and obligations as an "owner"
of the car, it would be difficult to discern the value of my car as
compared to other cars. It would be difficult to compare my
ownership powers and obligations to the ownership arrangements
that accompanied other cars. What is important to know about one
car would no longer be generalizable to other cars. I would not know
what I should pay for my car because I would lack vital information
about the comparative value of other cars. There would simply be too
many relevant variables to analyze.
Finally, imagine that my seller is one of seven previous "owners"
of the car in question, and that each time the car was sold, it was
sold subject to a complexly customized "ownership arrangement."
Each link in the car's chain of title would potentially represent the
introduction of numerous variables relevant to both the value of my
car and the scope of my interest in it (e.g., the power to use and
transfer it). Under such a system, I would have to anticipate that at
any moment a past "owner" could appear at my doorstep and
demand to use the car pursuant to an ownership arrangement that
long predates my connection to the car. Even if such prior
arrangements were disclosed to me in good faith, it is plausible-
even likely-that (as with customizable derivatives) the sheer
number of potential variables would leave me perennially uncertain
as to the scope of my powers and obligations with respect to the
object in question.
Thus, in the customizable-property world that we have imagined,
a feral-ness begins to emerge as the constraining structures of our
property practices break down. Familiar objects-like a car-
suddenly take on a menacing aspect. We become reluctant to invest
in these objects. We may even be disinclined to use our own objects
for fear of violating the rights of another. Within this imagined
world, the uncertainty and confusion that follow from customizable
property rights will grow exponentially with the passage of time
until they threaten to overwhelm all of our settled expectations
about objects in the material world.
right, and a "partial ownership" interest. Whether this hypothetical falls within the
ambit of what counts as a timeshare interest in property is fairly debatable (e.g.,
timeshare arrangements are generally standardized, not highly idiosyncratic as the
in the hypothetical). More importantly, the question itself falls within a potentially
broader critique of this project, which is skeptical of the claim that numerus clausus
succeeds in substantively prohibiting customized property interests. While this
skepticism is briefly address infra at Part II.A, a full consideration of this concern
must regretfully be reserved for a future project.
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In the grim, spectral light of this imagined world, the value of
limitation and of constraint is revealed. Our world is distinguished
from this imagined world by a solitary feature: the principle of
numerus clausus. Thus, one way to think about the normative force
of the principle of numerus clausus is that it "cages" what would
otherwise be the chaotic experience of interacting with objects in the
material world. It is in this not entirely theatrical sense, that
numerus clausus tames the wild beast of complexity.
III. THE MYSTERIOUS NUMERUS CLAUSUS
As heroes go, the principle of numerus clausus is an unlikely one.
As a superficial matter, there is, of course, the problem of its name:
ideas denoted in Latin rarely excite the romantic imagination. There
is also the fact that during our passing acquaintanceship with
numerus clausus in our first-year property class,8 7 most of us likely
found the principle to be idiosyncratic, inhibiting, and
anachronistic-hardly qualities we associate with heroism. A final
condemnation lies with its perceived lack of utility: the principle
does not appear to embody an intrinsic good or to serve a clear
purpose.88 Given these failings, it seems more sensible to question
why the principle persists at all, rather than to champion it.89
Yet despite its conspicuous shortcomings, the principle of
numerus clausus may be the most underappreciated of all the tools
within our legal arsenal. But before detailing the unsung role that
numerus clausus plays in taming our interactions with the tangible
world, it is appropriate that we should first attend to the principle's
less laudatory dimensions. It is, after all, conventional to bury Cesar
before praising him, and burying numerus clausus is not difficult as
there is much to fault about the principle. 90
As readers may recall, the phrase numerus clausus literally
means "the number is closed."91 As applied in American property
87. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 3 ("The principle is ... familiar to
anyone who has survived a first-year property course in an American law school.").
88. Cf. Dorfman, supra note 18, at 476-80 (arguing that numerus clausus fails
to limit the set of property forms and likewise fails to perform other suggested
functions).
89. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1598 (querying why the principle persists).
90. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 5 (concluding that the legal academy has
often assumed an "attitude of ... hostility" toward the principle, noting that the
literature is punctuated with "antipathy," "antagonism," and "causal criticisms" of
the principle).
91. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1598 (explaining that the name numerus
clausus originates "from the civil law concept that the 'number is closed"').
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law, the principle means that cognizable property interests must
conform to one of the existing forms of ownership. 92 No novel forms
are allowed.93 An owner can only convey a property interest in one of
the recognizable forms, which include the fee simple, fee simple
defeasible, life estate, and leasehold.94 In the event that an owner
attempts to convey a novel interest, courts will convert the novel
interest into a recognized interest.95 Off-menu ordering is simply not
permitted.
Thus, numerus clausus fundamentally inhibits private ordering
in property transfers. 96 While contract law allows for an "infinite
range of promises the law will honor,"97 property law will enforce
only a handful of ownership arrangements. 98 Contract law's
openness to innovation and individual preferences is an attribute
that is conventionally understood to promote efficiency in the
allocation of valuable resources. 99 In contrast, the principle of
numerus clausus seems to foreclose innovation in the allocation of
tangible resources while ensuring that property law remains
relatively insensitive to individual preferences.100
Moreover, in addition to seeming to hinder efficiency, the
principle suffers from a second and third intellectual blemish: the
principle can fairly be characterized as formalist, and its formalism
is thought to favor existing and entrenched distributions of property
interests. 0 1 To many, the principle of numerus clausus is to modern
92. Id. ("[Piroperty law recognizes only a limited and standard list of
mandatory forms.").
93. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 3 ("'[llncidents of a novel kind' cannot 'be
devised and attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner."').
94. Id. ("With respect to interests in land . .. the basic forms are the fee simple,
the defeasible fee simple, the life estate, and the lease."). This is not intended to be
an exhaustive list, and reasonable minds can and do disagree about what does and
does not "count" as a property form. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 1610-11. Also,
property use interests are likewise generally limited to existing forms, such as
easements or servitudes. Id. at 1607.
95. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 3 ("[I]f [parties] attempt to customize a
new type of interest, the courts will generally recast the conveyance as creating one
of the recognized forms.").
96. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1598.
97. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 3.
98. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1589.
99. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 5.
100. Cf. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 52, at 1257 (describing, in the context of
a proposal to standardize mortgage-backed securities, the degree to which
standardization limits individual choices).
101. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 6-7 (observing that scholars and judges
seem to react to the principle as if it were formalistic).
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property law what the principle of "freedom of contract" was to labor
law during the Lochner Era: a judicially-imposed and outmoded
obstacle to modernity and progressive ends. 102 Thus, by many lights,
numerus clausus is a doddering legal atavism: a feudal throwback to
our embarrassingly inefficient and inegalitarian past.103
How then is it possible that it continues to persist in modern
property doctrine?104 As Nestor Davidson aptly puts the question,
"what can explain a persistent feature of the law that seems, at first
glance, so clearly to restrict the autonomy and efficiency gains
conventionally associated with private property?"105 More surprising
still, as noted previously, this doddering legal atavism appears to be
a universal feature of all property systems. As Davidson observes,
"this transcendence suggests that there must be some overriding
structural reason" why all property systems employ standardization
with respect to property forms.106
The quest to identify an "overriding structural reason" for the
principle has generated a number of explanatory accounts of
numerus clausus.107 Because an explanatory theory purports to
explain (rather than justify) the presence of the principle in property
doctrine, to succeed these theories must account for each of the three
most salient features of numerus clausus: (1) its prohibition of novel
forms; (2) its universality; and (3) its unique application in property
law. 108 The degree to which competing accounts of the principle have
succeeded along this metric is explored below.
A. A Brief Intellectual History of Numerus Clausus
Although the principle of numerus clausus has been a part of our
system of property at least since the emergence of post-feudal
102. Compare Ilana Haramati & Michael A Zuckerman, Will SCOTUS Usher a
Return to the "Lochner Era?", CBS NEWS (April 6, 2012) http://www.cbsnews.com/830
1-215_162-57410077/will-scotus-usher-a-return-to-the-lochner-eral (discussing how
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) served as a basis for courts to routinely
strike down labor laws that addressed social welfare problems), with Merrill &
Smith, supra note 17, at 6-7 (stating that numerus clausus "reflects a 'feudal vision
of property relationships"').
103. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1619-22 (describing the concern that numerus
clausus causes inefficiencies); see, e.g., Singer, supra note 28, at 1024 (describing the
estate system as "disturbing to modern sensibilities").
104. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 19, at 1598; Dorfman, supra note 18, at 468-
69 (describing as the persistence of the principle as a "mystery").
105. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1598-99.
106. Id.
107. Cf. supra note 28 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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property rights, it received little scholarly attention until relatively
recently. 109 However, property theorists have recently more than
made up for this historical neglect of the principle. 1 0 Over the
course of the last decade, a lively colloquy has arisen around the
principle.11' This discussion has produced helpful insights about the
function of numerus clausus.112 A consideration of those ideas
follows.
1. Merrill and Smith and the Information-Cost Thesis
In recent years, a wealth of analysis has been focused on the
principle of numerus clausus.11 This recent spate of interest in the
principle was largely inaugurated in 2000 by the publication of
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith's now-canonical article, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle.114 In this piece and others that followed," 5 Merrill and
Smith argue that by preventing the customization of property rights,
numerus clausus serves to distinguish property rights from other
legal interests (i.e., interests created by contract).116
Merrill and Smith also provide an influential explanatory
account of the principle.117 Standardization in the form of numerus
clausus, they explain, functions to reduce what they describe as
"measurement costs."118 Measurement costs are incurred when a
prospective owner seeks to understand the nature and scope of
rights he can acquire in a desired object, as when a prospective
buyer seeks to buy a house.119 The prospective buyer "must measure
various attributes, ranging from the physical boundaries of a parcel,
to use rights, to the attendant liabilities of the owner to others (such
as adjacent owners)."120 Similar measurements must be taken when
109. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1599.
110. Cf. supra note 28.
111. See supra note 28.
112. See supra note 28.
113. See supra note 28.
114. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17.
115. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001) [hereinafter Property/Contract]; Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics, 111 YALE L.J.
357, 359 (2001) [hereinafter What Happened] (arguing that "property is required to
come in standardized packages that the layperson can understand at low cost").
116. Property/Contract, supra note 115, at 777.
117. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 1.
118. Id. at 33.
119. Id. at 24.
120. Id. at 26.
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a non-owner encounters owned property (e.g., an undeveloped parcel
of real property) and wishes to avoid violating the property rights of
the owner. 121 Numerus clausus reduces these information costs to
third parties by reducing the amount of information that third
parties must process in order to avoid violating property rights. 122
Thus, Merrill and Smith argue that standardization succeeds in
making some material information about ownership more accessible
(or accessible at a lower cost than it otherwise would be).12 3 They
provide the example of A, who would like to sell his watch to B to use
on Mondays only.124 Merrill and Smith conclude that such an
arrangement may prove beneficial to A and B, but that the
possibility of a Monday-only form of ownership would impose costs
on third parties.125 If such novel arrangements were possible, then
anyone who wished to buy a watch would have to investigate
whether the watch they intended to purchase was likewise burdened
by the idiosyncratic restriction.126 Thus, by taking the possibility of a
Monday-only ownership interest in a watch off the table,
standardization eliminates the need to investigate this
contingency.127 Information about the scope of the ownership
interest available in a watch is therefore accessible at a lower cost.12 8
It is important to note that Merrill and Smith concede that
numerus clausus does not reduce information costs to a bare
minimum.129 Numerus clausus is tolerant of a certain degree of
customization in the form of contingent variables.130 The principle
admits a set of forms that permit an owner to create property rights
that are subject to contingent conditions, such as restrictive
covenants and defeasible estates. The contingent conditions can be
quite unpredictable (or even "weird," as Joseph Singer has described
them).131 However, Merrill and Smith argue that some degree of
121. Id.
122. What Happened, supra note 115, at 387 ("If the legal system allowed in rem
rights to exist in a large variety of forms, then dutyholders would have to acquire
and process more information whenever they encountered something that is
protected by an in rem right.").
123. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 32-33.
124. Id. at 27-30.
125. Id. at 30.
126. Id. at 27.
127. Id. at 31.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 32-33.
130. Id. at 14.
131. Singer, supra note 28, at 1025 ("There is no rule against transferring
property to another person 'until Barack Obama wins the presidency,' for example.").
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flexibility in the creation of property interests is desirable. 132 For
Merrill and Smith, the function of numerus clausus is not to
eliminate information costs to the fullest extent possible, but rather
"to promote optimal standardization of property rights."133 "Optimal
standardization" in this scenario permits X number of forms where
'" represents the point at which the utility of having the forms
outweighs the costs imposed by the forms. 134
2. Critiques of the Information-Cost Thesis
Responses to Merrill and Smith's "information-cost thesis" of
numerus clausus were rapidly forthcoming.135 These responses offer
a range of insights and critiques directed at Merrill and Smith's
thesis.136 Two of the more significant critiques are considered in
detail below.
a. Hansmann and Kraakman and the Uniqueness Critique
An important consideration of the information-cost thesis was
undertaken by Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman who agree
with Merrill and Smith that "third-party information costs are
central to the law's regulation of property rights." 3 7 However,
Hansmann and Kraakman pose a key question in light of Merrill
and Smith's analysis: if the standardization of interests reduced
information costs to an optimal level in property, why does
standardization not serve the same function in the creation of
contract interests?138 In other words, Hansmann and Kraakman
object to Merrill and Smith's explanatory account of numerus
clausus on the grounds that it fails to account for numerus clausus'
unique utility in property. 139
Hansmann and Kraakman resolve the issue of uniqueness by
noting that burdens imposed in the creation of property interests
132. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 38-40.
133. Id. at 38.
134. Id. at 40.
135. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 28; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24.
136. See, e.g., supra note 135.
137. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 374.
138. Id. at 380 (arguing that the information-cost thesis "fails to explain why
property law is more restrictive than contract law. If there is an optimal finite





"run with the asset."140 By this they mean that "a property right in
an asset, unlike a contract right, can be enforced against subsequent
transferees of other rights in the asset."141 This feature of property
law, they argued, is the key distinguishing characteristic between
property interests and contract interests.142
For Hansmann and Kraakman, the fact that property law
permits rights to be enforced against successors in interest who were
not parties to the original conveyance explains why numerus clausus
is uniquely useful in the context of property transfers. 143 By their
lights, standardization is a mechanism by which property law
ensures that adequate notice is provided to subsequent
transferees. 144 Contract law requires no such mechanism because
contract rights are generally only enforceable against parties to the
contract.145 The contract itself provides the necessary notice and
verification of rights.146 However, in the property context, notice
must be standardized to avoid successors in interest incurring
prohibitively high information costs in their quest to verify their
interests. 147
In other words, Hansmann and Kraakman agree with Merrill
and Smith that standardization in property reduces information
costs, but they reject the idea that the limitation on forms reduces
costs to third parties by limiting the amount of information that
third parties need to process to avoid transgressing on the property
rights of others (or to ascertain their own rights).148 Instead,
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that the limitation on categories of
ownership is "inextricably intertwined" with the unique need in
property to verify interests that were created (or withheld) by remote
transferors.149 Numerus clausus fashions categories of ownership,
but these categories are merely a vehicle for the imposition of
verification rules. 50
140. Id. at 378-79.
141. Id. at 374.
142. Id. (concluding that this is the way in which "[p]roperty rights differ from
contract rights").
143. Id. at 375.
144. Id. at 384.
145. Id. at 383 ("The parties' mutual assent to the contract ... is the method by




148. Id. at 374.
149. Id. at 384.
150. Id. at 399 ("[Plroperty rights that fall outside the standard categories are
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b. Problems with the Verification Solution
Hansmann and Kraakman's uniqueness critique of Merrill and
Smith's information costs thesis of numerus clausus is well taken.151
However, their resolution of the uniqueness question ultimately
proves unsatisfactory as well. 152 In attempting to resolve this
mystery, Hansmann and Kraakman slightly mischaracterize the
relationship between the asset (e.g., the physical parcel of land that
is Blackacre) and a condition placed on the estate that conveys
interest in Blackacre (e.g., a defeasible fee).1 53 In the context of a
property interest, the estate, rather than the asset, is the
appropriate contract analogue. The estate creates enforceable
interests just as a contract creates enforceable interests. Conditions
(which we might profitably, if slightly erroneously, think of here as
promises to do things or not do things) may qualify the interests
created by the estate, just as conditions may qualify the interests
created by a contract. However, when the estate ends, so does the
imposition of the condition. 154 The condition does not follow the asset
into the next estate.
To illustrate this point, consider that Blackacre's owner (grantor)
may convey Blackacre "to A for so long as the property is used for
farming." The requirement that Blackacre must be used for farming
"runs with the asset" (or "runs with the land" as we conventionally
describe this attribute in property parlance).155 If A transfers the
property to subsequent owner B, B will likewise be obliged to meet
the condition or forfeit Blackacre. 56 However, once the condition
ceases to be met (i.e., the owner of Blackacre ceases to use it for
farming), the estate ends and the condition ends with it.157 In this
example, grantor (or his successor in interest) will then take
simply governed by highly unaccommodating verification rules that place a heavy
burden on the holder of the right to provide notice to third parties.").
151. Id. at 380.
152. Id. at 378-79.
153. See id. at 379.
154. It should be noted that conditions or restrictions that are placed on estates
can also end before a given estate ends. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d
1525, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding an easement held in fee simple terminated upon
abandonment of the use interest).
155. Cf. Alfred L. Brophy, Contemplating When Equitable Servitudes Run with
the Land, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 692-93 (2002) (discussing when servitudes run
with the land).
156. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 378-79.
157. RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 28
(Matthew Bender & Co. ed., abr. ed. 1968).
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Blackacre in fee simple absolute.158 Grantor need not use Blackacre
for farming. The condition survived only as long as the estate that
created the condition survived.159 Conditions that attend property
interests burden the "asset" for the duration of the estate.1 60
Now perhaps in using the term "asset," Hansmann and Kraaman
refer to the estate rather than the physical parcel of land that is
Blackacre.16' This is a reasonable construal, after all, as the legal
right to use and enjoy Blackacre is itself an entity of value separate
and apart from the inherent value of Blackacre (for example, as
shelter to a squatter). However, in that case, Hansmann and
Kraaman have identified a phenomenon that is not at all unique to
property. An estate is created when an interest-holder transfers his
interest to another party. This exchange of interests is the property-
interest analogue to a contract, and so it should not be at all
surprising that conditions or restrictions that were imposed on the
estate during the creation of the estate, will follow the estate. Such
conditions are entirely creatures of the estate.
In this light, we can see that the phenomenon of "following the
asset" is not unique to property law. Contract interests, too, are
burdened by conditions that last for the duration of the contract.162
For example, Professor Y may enter into a five-year contract to teach
at Blackacre University. That contract may contain a clause
prohibiting Professor Y from moonlighting at other universities.
Upon the termination of the contract, the clause that prohibits
Professor Y from working at other schools is likewise terminated. 16 3
Professor Y is not bound by that limitation beyond the duration of
the contract.164 Restrictions on interests created by contract "run
with the contract" just as restrictions on interests created by
property "run with the estate."
It should be noted that there is another set of conditions imposed
on property interests that seem to provide a better fit with
Hansmann and Kraakman's "running with the asset" description.16 5
Although conditions that limit defeasible estates have a clear




161. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 378-79.
162. In the context of contract, "conditions" are typically regarded as simply
contract terms. 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 38:4 (4th ed. 2003).
163. 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 75:2 (4th ed. 2003).
164. Id.




be met), servitudes (i.e., easements and covenants) do not seem to
have an inherent durational quality.166 An easement or covenant can
burden the servient estate indefinitely-there is no triggering event
that will end both the estate and restrictive condition.167
However, the conception of "estate" as an analogue to "contract"
provides the best framework in this context as well. When a
servitude arises, interests that were originally created by the estate
in Blackacre are asymmetrically split between two owners. 168
Sometimes this split arises voluntarily (as when the owner of
Blackacre sells an easement across Blackacre to the owner of
Whiteacre). Other times it arises by operation of law (as when the
owner of Whiteacre acquires a prescriptive easement over
Whiteacre).169 In either instance, the creation of the servitude
inaugurates two (or more, in the case of multiple dominant
tenements) new estates. These new estates (read: contracts)
supersede the previous estates. Where Blackacre was previously held
as a fee simple absolute unburdened by an easement, it is now a fee
simple absolute burdened by an easement. Similarly, while the
owner's interest in Blackacre has been diminished under the new
"contract," Whiteacre's owner's interest in Whiteacre has expanded.
Owners who take subsequent to the creation of these new estates are
merely assignees of the original estate holders.
Therefore, servitudes, like defeasible conditions, follow the
estate, not the asset. Moreover, a servitude, like a defeasible
condition, can be terminated.170 The servitude is not irrevocably tied
to the physical parcel that is Blackacre. If the benefited parcel and
burdened parcel come into the same hands, a servitude will be
extinguished.171 Similarly, the owners of the benefited and burdened
parcels may agree to terminate the servitude, or the owner of the
benefited parcel may abandon his rights.172 In any of these
circumstances, the servitude ceases to "follow" Blackacre.
Thus, the fact that conditions on property interests "run with the
asset" is not a meaningful means of distinguishing property interests
from contract interests. Restrictions on property interests can
burden subsequent owners who were not party to the original
conveyance, but when this happens, subsequent owners simply
become assignees of the original grantee. Subsequent owners accept
166. POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 157, at 532-33.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 767.
169. Id. at 794 (describing the creation of easements by prescription).





their property interest subject to the restrictions assumed by the
original grantee until the duration of the estate is ended. Once the
estate itself is extinguished, the conditions are likewise
extinguished.
Moreover, the fact that property interests are assignable in this
manner does little to distinguish property interests from contract
interests. 173 It is often said that in granting Blackacre, an owner can
only convey an interest equal to or less than she has.1 7 4 An owner's
capacity to convey rights in Blackacre is controlled by her estate,
just as the holder of a contract interest's capacity to convey interests
under the contract is limited by the interest she holds under the
contract.17 5 For example, if Professor Yin the above example assigns
her interests under her contract to Professor Z, she cannot give
Professor Z the right to teach at Blackacre University while
moonlighting at another school. Professor Y cannot convey greater
rights than she holds. Similarly, if a property owner holds a fee
simple determinable (as in the example in which Blackacre must be
used for farming), he can convey the estate that he has (i.e., a fee
simple determinable) or a lesser estate (e.g., a life estate
determinable).176 He cannot convey a fee simple absolute. 177
Now one might sensibly offer the following objection at this stage
of the analysis: contract assignees are in privity of contract with a
party to the original transaction. 78 We need not assign verification
rules to "categories" of contract rights because the contract itself
provides notice to assignees. 179 In contrast, property grantees are
often many generations removed from the transaction that created
the original estate. Therefore, the objection would hold, notifying
remote grantees of their rights poses a unique problem in property,
and that unique problem could potentially explain the phenomenon
of standardization in property. 180
173. 29 Williston on Contracts § 74:27 (4th ed. 2003) ("Contract duties are
generally delegable, unless prohibited by statute, public policy or the terms of the
contract.").
174. See Knud E. Hermansen & Donald R. Richards, Maine Roads and
Easements, 48 ME. L. REV. 197, 277 (1996) ("[A] subsequent owner can convey no




178. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 383 ("The problem of
verification is more difficult in the case of property rights for the reason that two or
more holders of property rights in a given asset may not be in privity of contract.").
179. Id.
180. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 383-84.
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In fact, Hansman and Kraakman point to the fact that contracts
require mutual assent to support the inference that the contract
itself serves to ensure that parties have adequate notice of their
rights.181 They observe, "parties' mutual assent to the contract,
testified to by signatures or other conventional means, is the method
by which the parties signal to each other that they share a common
understanding of their rights-namely, the understanding expressed
in the contract."182
However, upon deeper examination, the privity-of-contract
distinction seems overdrawn. Although the idea that "mutuality of
assent" solves notice problems that are endemic in the context of
property transfers is intuitively appealing, we should not be misled
by the turn of phrase. The requirement of mutual assent assures
that parties agree to the material terms of the contract. But the
requirement does not assure that parties to the contract understand
limitations on their rights that result from one party's obligations
under a different contract (or other legal obligation).
An example may be helpful in illuminating this point: assume
that A and B enter into an employment contract. A agrees to work
for one year as a software engineer at B Enterprises. B agrees to
compensate A with X amount of salary and benefits. A and B assent
to the material terms and sign the contract. If Hansmann and
Kraakman's account is correct, then A and B have received adequate
notice of their interests under the contract.183 Now let us assume
that prior to entering into the contract with B, A signed a
noncompete agreement with her previous employer, C. Under the
terms of the noncompete agreement, A is precluded from working for
B. Consequently, B's rights with respect to the A-B contract are
limited by an obligation that A assumed prior to executing the A-B
contract. 184 A and B's mutual assent does nothing to provide B with
notice of the terms of the A-C contract, yet the A-C contract
potentially limits B's interests under the A-B contract.
The A, B, C example illustrates the specific notice problem in
property transfers. The thorniest part of the problem of providing
notice to remote grantees results not from a lack of understanding of
what the remote grantor purports to convey to the remote grantee,
but rather it results from the fact that remote grantor's power to
convey what he purports to convey may be limited by a different and
previous conveyance. Thus, even if remote grantor and remote
181. Id. at 383.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 392.




grantee share the same understanding of the interests to be
conveyed (e.g., they both think grantee is receiving a fee simple
absolute in Blackacre), they both may be wrong about remote
grantor's ability to grant what he purports to grant (e.g., remote
grantor only holds a fee simple determinable in Blackacre and
therefore lacks the power to convey a fee simple absolute).
Thus, appeal to the criterion of "mutual assent" to ensure that
parties to a contract have adequate notice of their rights misses the
point of the risk that a remote grantee assumes. The remote grantee
is subject to the risk that transferor lacks the power to transfer what
she purports to transfer. More importantly, the risk that remote
grantees assume is not distinct from the risk that parties to a
contract assume. Any time that parties seek to transfer interests,
there is a risk that one party lacks the power to transfer the interest
she purports to transfer. Thus, it is not clear that parties in privity
of contract are insulated from the notice difficulties that Hansmann
and Kraakman point to as especially plaguing transfers of property
interests.
There are, nonetheless, two additional reasons we might believe
that a party in privity of contract receives better notice of the rights
transferred to him under a contract than a property interest grantee
whose rights are subject to restrictions assigned from a remote
grantor. The first has to do with specificity. We may believe that
contracts do a better job of specifying the interests they create than
property conveyances. Yet, a contract may or may not do a good job
of specifying the interests that are created.185 Enforceable rights
may emerge from contracts where the parameters of obligation are
far from clear.186 At the same time, property interests are not
transferred by magical innuendo. Every grantee of a property
interest takes that interest pursuant to some assertion purporting to
describe the interest conveyed. When the asset conveyed is an
interest in real property, the description of the interest transferred
is in writing.187 There may be no mutuality of obligation or assent in
the transfer of property interests, but neither of these requirements
185. Cf. George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response
to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1066-67 (2002)
(observing that "vague" contract terms are "ubiquitous").
186. See id. at 1067, 1074 ("The apparent willingness of commercial parties to
agree to vague terms is puzzling.... [O]ne would expect that parties strive to reduce
the uncertainty and cost of judicial interpretation of their bargain-as well as the
imposition of external judicial values-by agreeing to . . . precise, bright-line
rules . . . .").
187. JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL H.
SCHILL, PROPERTY 183, 541 (7th ed. 2012).
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ensures that interests created by the contract will be identified with
particular specificity.188 In short, there is little reason to believe that
contract rights, as a class, are delineated with greater specificity
than rights created by conveyances of property.
A second reason we may believe that parties in privity of
contract have better notice of their rights concerns the potential
omission of relevant information in conveyances of real property.189
When 0 transfers Blackacre to A, she may do so by means of a deed
that omits relevant information about A's rights. 0 may omit
information in the deed about liens, servitudes, or defeasible
conditions, which burden O's estate in Blackacre. 0 may omit this
information to induce A to purchase Blackacre, or because 0 is
ignorant of these limitations on O's estate. Here, we are concerned
less with the specificity and more with the accuracy of the rights
described by the conveyance. 0 may purport in the transaction to
transfer a fee simple absolute in Blackacre unburdened by liens or
servitudes, when in fact 0 lacks the power to transfer an unfettered
fee simple.190
However, this, too, is a risk that is not unique to property
transfers. It is true that every property transferee takes the risk
that transferor lacks the power to transfer the interest he is
purporting to transfer. Yet, every recipient of a contract interest also
takes the risk that transferor lacks power to transfer the interest he
purports to transfer. Both contract and property principles generally
account for this risk by permitting some form of compensation where
a transferee is damaged by the omission. Of course, ensuring
adequate notice avoids the more costly route of compensation after
injury, but it is not clear why the property transferee, in particular,
requires an elaborately constructed scheme (i.e., numerus clausus) to
ensure he has adequate notice, while the contract transferee does
not.
Finally, the most significant reason why Hansmann and
Kraakman's notice-based account fails to adequately address the
uniqueness question has to do with the tenuous link between
numerus clausus and notice. Hansmann and Kraakman contend
that numerus clausus facilitates verification of property interests by
allowing the law to impose specifically tailored notice requirements
188. See Triantis, supra note 185, at 1066-67.
189. See, e.g., Willard v. First Church of Christ, 498 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1972)
(discussing how a deed omitted information regarding an easement).
190. See, e.g., Brown v. Lober, 389 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. 1979) (discussing how a
grantor purported to convey 100 percent of mineral rights but owned only two-thirds
of the mineral rights).
106 [Vol. 81:79
COMPLEXITY IN PROPERTY
on different categories of ownership. 191 On this view, numerus
clausus serves as an organizational platform for disseminating rules
about notice.192 However, it is not clear why a platform for
disseminating rules about notice should be organized around forms
of ownership. In some cases, numerus clausus (and the rules of
property generally) do a terrible job of ensuring that a restriction on
interest will not be imposed on a transferee who lacks notice.193 This
is especially so for durational restrictions on the estates, which are
perhaps the most significant limits that can be placed on a property
interest.194 For instance, if 0 purports to transfer a fee simple
absolute in Blackacre to A, but 0 holds only a life estate in
Blackacre, A will only receive a life estate in Blackacre. 195
Similarly, there are other platforms that could better achieve the
result of disseminating tailored rules about notice while avoiding the
imposition on autonomy and innovation that is presented by
numerus clausus' limitation on forms of ownership. 196 In fact,
property law primarily provides for verification via notice rules that
are wholly extrinsic to numerus clausus, such as recording acts and
systems of registry for chattel.197
Moreover, in the real property context, the simplest and cheapest
way of ensuring verification of interests to remote transferees is to
require recordation as a criterion of title transfer. In such a scenario,
title would not transfer unless or until the interest was recorded. If
property law were primarily concerned with verification, as
Hansmann and Kraakman opine,198 then incorporating notice as an
aspect of ownership would seem to be a much less costly way of
achieving that end.
191. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 374-75.
192. Id. at 375.
193. Consider, for example, the rule that allows a joint tenant unilaterally and
without notice to destroy her co-tenant's right of survivorship. See, e.g., Riddle v.
Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1980) (holding that a woman was allowed to destroy her
co-tenant's right of survivorship by unilaterally transferring her interest in property
from herself as a joint tenant to herself as a tenant in common).
194. See, e.g., Harper v. Paradise, 210 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. 1974) (grantor purported
to convey a fee simple via execution of a mortgage but only held a life estate).
195. See id. at 713-14.
196. See, e.g., Bruce W. Burton, In Search of John Constable's The White Horse:
A Case Study in Tortured Provenance and Proposal for a Torrens-Like System of Title
Registration for Artwork, 59 FLA. L. REV. 531 (2007) (exploring potential applications
of the Australian Torrens land-title registration system).
197. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 157, at 1045-58 (describing recording
systems).
198. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 382.
2013]1 107
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
So Hansmann and Kraakman's critique of the information-cost
thesis of numerus clausus raised an important challenge to the
information-cost thesis of numerus clausus: why does numerus
clausus appear to have unique utility in the context of property
interests? 199 Yet while Hansmann and Kraakman offer an
interesting alternative account of the principle, that account
ultimately falls short of resolving the uniqueness mystery.
c. Skepticism about Information-Cost Reduction
Hansmann and Kraakman also raise a second important
challenge to the information-cost thesis of numerus clausus.200 They
express skepticism about Merrill and Smith's causal claim that
numerus clausus succeeds in reducing information costs to third
parties. 201 For Hansmann and Kraakman, numerus clausus fails in
reducing "measurement costs," at least in the manner contemplated
by Merrill and Smith, because the principle fails to regulate the
content of property interests. 202 Hansmann and Kraakman contend:
Property law tends to regulate the available categories of
property rights. It generally leaves the specific content of those
rights to be individually specified by the parties who create them,
thus allowing substantial room for all the uncertainty and
measurement problems that Merrill and Smith see property law as
mitigating.203
Similar skepticism has been advanced by others. 204 Joseph
Singer, for example, contends that numerus clausus cannot be
credited with "simplifying" our property practices or making our
property arrangements "clear and understandable" insofar as it fails
to eliminate peculiar and unpredictable property arrangements. 20 5
Singer notes "even though the law limits us to the fee simple, the
199. Id. at 380.
200. Id. at 399 (expressing skepticism that numerus clausus reduces information
costs).
201. Id. at 401 ("The 'information-processing costs' and 'measurement costs'
facing someone who is contemplating the purchase of real estate that might be
subject to an easement, for example, are not increased by the fact that the law also
allows for property rights in other types of assets . . .
202. Id. at 374, 401.
203. Id. at 382.
204. See, e.g., Dorfman, supra note 18, at 475 (arguing that the information-cost
thesis is flawed because it "confuse[s] form restriction with form reduction").
205. Singer, supra note 28, at 1023-26 (asserting that the system of estates does
not "result[] in any type of simplification or standardization of the package of rights
that goes along with ownership").
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defeasible fee, the life estate, the lease, and mortgage-financing
arrangements of various kinds, property law places few limits on the
kinds of conditions and covenants that can be imposed on land
ownership."206 He observes that the principle of numerus clausus
does not prevent land from being burdened with any number of
"weird" conditions that defy "ordinary expectations."207 Singer notes,
for example, that "the widespread use of homeowners associations
means that buyers of land must search the voluminous covenants,
conditions, and restrictions contained in the recorded declaration, as
well as the governing rules of the association, to find out what their
rights will be if they buy the property."208
Moreover, skeptics of the information-cost thesis offer a second
and related criticism. 209 Not only does numerus clausus regulate the
wrong aspects of ownership (in focusing on form rather than content)
but numerus clausus may not, according to some critics,
meaningfully regulate any aspect of ownership. 210 The root of this
concern lies in the (false) conventional wisdom that parties to a
property interest transaction can "contract around" the forms of
property to achieve virtually any substantive end that they desire.
As Avihay Dorfman has stated, "it is roundly acknowledged that
private persons can 'almost always' achieve whatever it is that they
initially aim to achieve through manipulating the existing forms of
property rights, without being forced to tailor a novel form."2 1 1 If
parties can create whatever substantive property arrangements they
prefer while operating within the confines of numerus clausus, it
stands to reason that numerus clausus is not doing any work to
simplify those arrangements.
Thus, skeptics of Merrill and Smith's claim that numerus
clausus reduces information costs to third parties raise two related
challenges to the claim. First, they worry that because numerus
clausus regulates form rather than content (and it therefore allows
any number of peculiar and unpredictable property arrangements),
the principle does not reduce the cost of obtaining information about
property rights.212 Also, critics worry that numerus clausus may not
actually impose a substantive restriction on the kinds of property
206. Id. at 1025.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Dorfman, supra note 18, at 478 (offering the criticism that numerus clausus
fails to regulate property interests).
210. Id. at 483 ("What is the point of form restriction .. . if it . .. does not target
the substance of the transactions[?]").
211. Id. at 478.
212. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 374.
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interests that will be enforced because parties to a transaction can
generally contract around the forms to achieve any desired end. 2 1 3
The merits of each of these concerns are explored in detail below.
d. Rethinking Cost-Reduction Skepticism
Skepticism about cost-reduction has proved to be one of the most
oft-repeated and enduring criticisms of Merrill and Smith's thesis.214
Consequently, it warrants careful and detailed consideration. As
noted above, the criticism is centered upon two related but distinct
ideas: first, that numerus clausus regulates the wrong aspect of
ownership; and second, that numerus clausus fails to meaningfully
regulate ownership at all. Each of these ideas is considered
independently below.
i. Content Versus Form
To evaluate the merit of the concern that numerus clausus fails
to reduce information costs, let us begin first with the idea that it is
the content, rather than the form of property interests that
"complicates" property rights and increases information costs. 2 15 In
support of this supposition, critics have observed that both the scope
of incidents and the scope of interest can vary greatly within a
particular form. 216 The incidents and interest that attend a fee
simple absolute that is encumbered by an easement, a mortgage, and
two restrictive covenants are quite different from the incidents and
interest that attend a fee simple absolute that is unfettered by
encumbrances. As a result, if 0 grants Blackacre to A in fee simple
absolute, A will require much more information than merely the
form of ownership to ascertain the scope of her interest in the
property. Further, "form-only" regulation clouds the informational
waters for third-party strangers to the conveyance as well. The fact
that numerous clausus tolerates such encumbrances means that a
third party must consider the possibility that an asset that she is
considering buying may be so burdened.217
Conflated within the foregoing analyses are two distinct
concerns. The first concern has to do with intersectionality: the
content of ownership rights is complicated by the fact that forms of
213. Dorfman, supra note 18, at 478.
214. See, e.g., id. at 473; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 374.
215. See Singer, supra note 28, at 1025.
216. Id.
217. This is the "watch-on-Mondays" problem that Merrill and Smith claim
numerus clausus avoids. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 27.
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ownership often intersect with one another. One owner's easement
constitutes a diminution of an adjacent owner's interest.218 A fee
simple may be complicated by the existence of a restrictive covenant.
A second problem results from the fact that a degree of contingency
is inherent within certain forms of ownership-notably defeasible
estates, servitudes, and mortgages. 219 Each of these forms permits a
grantor to impose certain "customized" restrictions on property. It is
useful to consider these concerns individually.
Intersectionality
At the heart of the intersectionality concern is the worry that
numerus clausus' limitation on property forms fails to promote
uniformity of interests within the forms. Thus, two owners, 0 and X,
may hold the same form of property interest-for example, a fee
simple absolute-yet 0 and X's estates may differ greatly from one
another in terms of interest and incidents. This lack of uniformity
means that property forms are not immediately or intuitively
comparable with one another, which presents a problem from the
perspective of information-cost reduction. Simply knowing the form
of the estate that 0 and X hold does not effectively communicate the
extent to which restrictions encumber the properties. 0 and X will
incur "measurement costs" to adduce their interests in the property,
and numerus clausus does not affect these costs.
To a limited degree, this concern is well taken. Generally
speaking, there are four categories of restriction that can complicate
ownership arrangements They are: (1) pecuniary restrictions (e.g.,
liens and mortgages), (2) quantitative interest restrictions (e.g.,
concurrent interests), (3) durational use restrictions (e.g., defeasible
conditions), and (4) non-durational use restrictions (e.g., easements
and covenants). Each of these categories of restriction can be applied
to an estate of any duration--e.g., a fee simple, a life estate, or a
leasehold. Moreover, multiple restrictions from multiple categories
can burden a single estate. This can seem to produce substantive
inconsistences within the strictures of a given durational form.
Where a given durational form intersects with multiple
restrictions-or as Singer has described it, "voluminous covenants,
conditions, and restrictions"-the result can appear to be a set of
218. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 1.2 (2000).
219. See, e.g., In re Hungerford, 285 N.Y.S. 820 (Sur. Ct. 1935) (discussing that
an estate may be vested until the occurrence of a specific contingency, at which point
ownership transfers from one person to another).
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highly individualized and idiosyncratic estates within a single
form.220
However, this concern about consistency within forms plays upon
a basic misapprehension about the category of "property form."
Although it is frequently said that the forms of property generally
consist of the fee simple, the life estate, the leasehold, the mortgage,
servitudes, etc., this list is actually quite incomplete insofar as it
excludes the phenomenon of intersectionality among forms. 221 When
we account for intersectionality, the "list" of recognized forms grows
substantially. In this light, we understand a fee simple absolute that
is burdened by an encumbrance to be a distinct form of ownership
from the unfettered fee simple. In this taxonomy, we would
understand the intersection of two or more forms to create a
separate, stand-alone form. So, for example, we would acknowledge
not only (1) the fee simple, (2) the mortgage, and (3) the easement as
forms of ownership, but we would also consider (4) the fee simple
subject to an easement to be a form, as well as (5) the fee simple
subject to an easement and a mortgage, and so forth.
Within this understanding, numerus clausus succeeds in
promoting uniformity and comparability within forms. It is, of
course, not perfect uniformity or comparability-one estate that is
subject to an easement may involve a use restriction in the form of a
right-of-way, while another may involve a restriction on boating-
but the particular type of form restriction imposed by numerus
clausus permits us to categorize these distinctions into ever more
specific forms of ownership. We could understand a fee simple
subject to a right-of-way to be one kind of form of ownership, while a
fee simple subject to a boating restriction is another, distinct form,
and so forth.
Further, this "micro-categorization" is completely consistent with
the structure of our system of property forms. Intersected property
forms are comprised, simply, of independent and discrete property
forms. A fee simple absolute that is burdened by a right-of-way
encompasses two long-recognized forms of ownership: the fee simple
(held, for example, by a servient tenement owner) and the right-of-
way (held by a dominant tenement holder). Yet only by examining
the intersection of these two interests can we fully appreciate the
imprint that a right-of-way visits upon a fee simple estate. It is only
at the intersection of these two forms that critical features of the
burdened estate can be discovered.
220. Singer, supra note 28, at 1025.
221. See discussion supra Part I.
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Moreover, while an intersectionality-sensitive understanding of
property forms may seem to emphasize technical distinctions and
details, these distinctions are quite significant in that they
illuminate the work that numerus clausus is doing in the context of
ordering information about the interests and incidents of ownership.
Numerus clausus provides a cartography and taxonomy for tracing
the interaction and consequences of adjacent rights. In so doing, the
principle provides us a uniform language with which to describe the
interaction of variables, and thereby to anticipate future legal
obligations. The principle then maps those interactions and
consequences onto particular estates. As a result, a list of forms that
accounts for intersectionality offers a fairly comprehensive account
of the topology of interests that accompany a given estate.
Similarly, and significantly, although the list of property forms is
substantially longer when we take intersectionality into account, the
list is manageable. Importantly, the list is not infinite, as it would be
in the absence of numerus clausus. This is because numerus clausus
not only identifies discrete interests-the principle also delineates
and constitutes those interests. In requiring that interests comport
with recognized forms, the principle necessarily delineates the
boundaries of those forms.
This means that the form of, say, an equitable servitude is
delineated by particular criteria that distinguish whether a given
restriction falls within the extension of the legal concept of
"equitable servitude." For example, assume I sell you my house but
in the deed I purport to require you to hold a monthly requiem
service at the grave of my pet poodle, Noodle, who is buried in the
front yard. Such an arrangement may constitute a contract between
you and me, but to constitute a property interest (in me) or a
property encumbrance (on your estate) it must meet the criteria of
"equitable servitude."222 If the restriction fails to meet the criteria, it
will not be binding on successors in interest and is not properly
understood as an encumbrance on your estate. In that circumstance,
the agreement is nothing more than a personal obligation that you
undertook, having nothing to do with your rights (or the rights of
others) in the tangible object that we also exchanged.
Here, it becomes clear that numerus clausus' form restriction
also serves an important content restriction function. In the Noodle
requiem example, the agreement would indeed fail to meet one of the
criteria of an equitable servitude: it fails to "touch and concern" the
222. This interest could also be classified as a negative easement, but the
classification of the interest is not central to the point.
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land (i.e., your tangible property).223 Consequently, the agreement is
excluded from the category of "equitable servitude." Although you
and I may both wish the agreement to be binding on successors in
interest, numerus clausus forecloses that possibility.
Numerus clausus then exercises considerable criterial-control
over forms of ownership. In this way, numerus clausus works to
weed out some of the "weirdest" of weird conditions that vagaries of
human whimsy might otherwise impose on land use and ownership
(a point we shall return to shortly).224 By eliminating these and a
potentially infinite host of other such possibilities, numerus clausus
keeps the list of possible ownership interests to an admittedly-yet
not overwhelmingly-large set.
Thus, rather than obscuring or even proliferating hidden
restrictions, numerus clausus, properly understood, serves as a
compass for discovering what would otherwise be hidden restriction
and obligations that are inherent in the practice of people living
together in a world of finite material resources. Interests that would
otherwise be obscured by the complexity brought about by the
interaction of an infinite number of variables (in the form of
idiosyncratic interests, obligations, and criteria for each) are instead
brought into sharper and more manageable relief by virtue of the
disciplining effect of the principle.
Contingency
Skeptics of the information-cost thesis also voice considerable
concern over the fact that numerus clausus allows for a substantial
degree of contingency in the creation of property interests. 22 5
Numerus clausus tolerates the imposition of conditions on ownership
and even permits those conditions to be weird and unpredictable (as
in Singer's example of "to A if Obama wins the presidency"). 226 We
could, the argument goes, adopt a system of complete
standardization of conditions-or content-as well as forms (e.g.,
conditions like "until A marries" and "for farming use only" are
allowed, while all others are prohibited). Simpler still, we could
eliminate the enforcement of all conditions. In failing to do either of
these, critics posit that numerus clausus leaves unregulated the
source of the most significant "measurement costs" that arise in the
context of ascertaining property rights.227
223. See Generally POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 157, at 717.
224. See Singer, supra note 28, at 1025.
225. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 382.
226. Singer, supra note 28, at 1025.
227. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 382.
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To illustrate this point, consider the four categories of ownership
restriction introduced above: (1) pecuniary restrictions (i.e., liens and
mortgages), (2) quantitative interest restrictions (i.e., concurrent
interests), (3) durational use restrictions (i.e., defeasible conditions),
and (4) non-durational use restrictions (i.e., easements and
covenants). The material terms of these restrictions are not
standardized, even within a given category. For example, the
material terms of one mortgage may vary substantially from the
material terms of another. Similarly, the material terms of a
defeasible vary greatly from one estate to another. 0 may grant
Blackacre to A "for so long as Blackacre is used for farming." On the
other hand, 0 may grant Whiteacre to B "for so long as B remains
married." Simply knowing that A or B holds a fee simple
determinable tells us nothing about the substantive restriction that
is placed on their respective estates.
In fact, critics of the information-cost thesis correctly observe
that numerus clausus does not resolve the fundamental
uncertainties that surround each of these categories of restriction. 228
Thus, estates burdened with restrictions encompass an intractable
degree of contingency that is unaffected by the form of restriction
imposed by numerus clausus. Hence, critics conclude that because
numerus clausus fails to resolve these uncertainties, it likewise fails
to meaningfully reduce information costs (at least in the manner
contemplated by Merrill and Smith).229
The heart of this criticism is the fact that numerus clausus fails
to generate a particular kind of knowledge: it fails to answer a
subset of questions about the content of the restrictions that are
placed on ownership. Moreover, proponents of this position are
largely correct that numerus clausus fails to generate this category
of knowledge. Now, to be clear, numerus clausus does generate some
important knowledge in this context insofar as the principle cabins
the potential content of restrictions by exercising its criterial-control
over the forms, as is illustrated by the elimination of the Noodle-
requiem requirement described above. As a result, we know that
enforceable restrictions will adopt certain characteristics and meet
certain criteria.
Nonetheless, this criticism is accurate insofar as it highlights an
epistemic function that numerus clausus fails to perform. Numerus
clausus does not tell us what conditions must be met for certain
property rights to vest or divest. But this failure is not as
devastating to the information-cost reduction thesis as its critics
228. Id. at 401.
229. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 28, at 1026.
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seem to imagine. Merrill and Smith's point that numerus clausus
aims at "optimal," rather than complete, standardization is well
taken here.230 Although complete standardization of property
interests (e.g., allowing only a fee simple absolute transfer and
nothing else) would generate the greatest degree of certainty of title,
that certainty would be secured at a significant cost in terms of
flexibility and autonomy in ownership.
More significantly, although numerus clausus fails to answer
specific questions about vesting and divesting conditions, it does
serve a much more essential epistemic function in terms of
eliminating a potentially infinite host of possible ownership
arrangements and thereby maintaining a manageable taxonomy of
ownership options. The import of this epistemic function is explored
in greater detail in Part III.A below.
ii. The "Contract Around" Argument
A second argument offered in support of cost-reduction
skepticism holds that numerus clausus fails to meaningfully
regulate any aspect of ownership. 231 This argument is predicated on
the proposition, advanced by many, that parties to a property
transaction can "almost always" contract around the form
restrictions of numerus clausus and still achieve any substantive
goal.2 32 Dorfman states this belief in its most emphatic form, opining
that numerus clausus may not be a principle of form reduction at
all.2 3 3 He understands the forms to be entirely fungible and
concludes, "'[florm restriction,' then, stands for the proposition that
private parties can design their transactions however they see fit to
the extent that they invoke existing forms of property rights." 2 34
Yet, despite the fact that versions of this concern are frequently
echoed in the literature, the concern seems overstated. It is true that
parties to a transaction are sometimes stymied in their substantive
goals because they selected the wrong form where a different form
would have both met their goals and complied with numerus
clausus. Examples of this phenomenon abound in both the common
law and the literature. 235 One simple example involves a grantor
230. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 38.
231. See Dorfman, supra note 18, at 478.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 475.
234. Id. at 482.
235. See, e.g., Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 144 A. 245 (Md. 1929) (holding
that a provision in a fee simple deed requiring consent of the grantor for any
conveyance within four years is void).
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purporting to convey a fee simple while withholding the power to
transfer, an interest that is excluded by numerus clausus.236 Insofar
as the grantor wishes to withhold the right to transfer because he
wants to ensure the property descends to the grantee's heirs, the
same substantive goal could be achieved by employing different
forms (i.e., a life estate followed by a remainder in the heirs).
However, we cannot draw from this or similar examples the
conclusion that Dorfman and others would have us draw. It is not
the case that parties to a property transaction can achieve any
substantive goal. Recall again the example of the car that I want to
purchase from the New England Patriots fan. In that hypothetical,
the grantor was willing to "sell" me the car, but subject to a set of
byzantine restrictions that included surrendering the car to her on
certain occasions which were to be determined by the future success
of her favorite football team. Such a transaction is prohibited by
numerus clausus, and there is no degree of shifting or cobbling
together of forms that would permit the grantor's substantive goals
to be realized. The transaction is simply excluded.
What this perhaps seemingly unlikely hypothetical illustrates is
that most of the time grantor and grantee's substantive goals align
fairly well with the substantive commitments of property law.
Whether parties' substantive goals generally align well with what
the law allows because we have sufficiently internalized the norms
that underlie our property system, or, alternatively, because the
forms of property do an especially good job of capturing the realities
of our broader social practices (as Dagan would have it),237 Most Of
the time when parties try to create property interests, they try to
create interests that are substantively permitted. Consequently,
there is generally a form of ownership that accommodates the typical
substantive goals. It is only the highly idiosyncratic substantive goal
that is left unfulfilled by the principle of numerus clausus.
Indeed, numerus clausus' primary regulatory role is barring the
highly idiosyncratic property interest. It is important to be clear,
however, that this does not mean that most interests are allowed
while only a handful of fringe interests are excluded. On the
contrary, while the most commonly sought interests are allowed,
many more interests are excluded than are allowed.
In fact, numerus clausus excludes a potentially infinite number
of interests. If we recall the earlier discussion of complex derivatives,
it becomes clear that if parties to a property transaction were
236. See id. at 247.




permitted to create specifically-tailored interests, there would be a
potentially infinite array of enforceable property interests. Although
it would likely still be the case that most property transfers would
assume familiar forms (i.e., fee simples, life estates), a subset of
property interests would be contingently tailored in a manner that
mirrors derivative contracts.
Moreover, the existence of even a subset of individually-tailored
property interests would threaten to bring an overwhelming degree
of complexity to our property system. Part III discusses why this is
so and how numerus clausus prevents it.
In sum, critics of the information-cost thesis raise important
challenges to the thesis. The most significant of these are the
uniqueness challenge and skepticism about cost reduction. As
explained above, the uniqueness challenge is well taken, and an
adequate explanation of the principle of numerus clausus must
address this challenge. On the other hand, skepticism about cost-
reduction, to some degree, simply misses the point of the epistemic
function of numerus clausus. Each of these points is ultimately
resolved in light of the complexity thesis advanced here. However,
before turning to the heart of that thesis, it is useful to first consider
the strengths and weaknesses of a few other theses that have been
offered as alternatives to the information-cost thesis.
3. Alternatives to the Information-Cost Thesis
Following Merrill and Smith's initial contribution, Hansmann
and Kraakman offered the first alternative account of the function of
numerus clausus, as is summarized above. Rather than reducing
information costs for third parties, Hansmann and Kraaman claim
that property law as a whole (including the numerus clausus
principle) operates to regulate the type of notice that creators of
unusual property interests must provide to remote transferees. 238
Other alternative accounts quickly followed.239 Most of these
accounts involved substantially less engagement with Merrill and
Smith's central idea than the Hansmann and Kraaman account. 240
Instead, most subsequent accounts posited theses of numerus
clausus that adopted, as a point of embarkation, the uniqueness and
causal skepticism critiques offered by Hansmann and Kraakman.241
Two of these are considered in detail below. 2 4 2
238. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 382.
239. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 28, at 1565 (offering his 2003 account of
numerus clausus as a facilitator of "human interactions.").
240. See, e.g., id. at 1567.
241. See id. at 1566 (briefly summarizing the Merrill/Smith-
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a. Dagan's Default-Framework Thesis
In 2003, in the wake of the Merrill/Smith-Hansmann/Kraakman
conversation, Hanoch Dagan offered a fascinating and insightful
explanatory account of the function of numerus clausus.243 In this
account, Dagan proposes that numerus clausus functions to create a
set of default frameworks for "human interaction."244 Dagan's
account understands property forms as "intermediary social
constructs through which law interacts with-reflects and shapes-
our social values."24 5 Limiting the forms of ownership "consolidat[es]
expectations and express[es] ideal forms of relationship."246 The
virtue of creating default "social constructs" appears to be that it
maintains the "normative integrity of the institution of property."247
In staking out a new explanatory account of numerus clausus,
Dagan's ambition is to take "seriously" the content of the property
forms that numerus clausus admits.248 Dagan proposes thinking
about property forms as a series of default suggestions for
Hansmann/Kraakman exchange and concluding that "Hansmann and Kraakman are
closer to the truth in focusing on verification and notice as major manifestations of
property law's concern for third parties' interests.").
242. It should be noted that Avihay Dorfman has also offered an alternative
explanatory account of the principle, in which he contends that the principle
embodies a commitment to democratic self-government. Dorfman, supra note 18, at
61. However, Dorfman's democratic self-governance thesis fails, as a threshold
matter, to account for the principle's universality. It is certainly not the case that all
of the post-feudal systems of property that have employed a rule of numerus clausus
have done so pursuant to a preceding commitment to democratic self-governance.
Many (if not most) of those systems of government have failed to manifest or
constitute such a commitment in public law, so it seems unlikely that such a
commitment implicitly underlies the structure of those countries' property systems.
While it may be the case that application of the numerus clausus principle is
consistent as a principle of democratic self-governance, a commitment to democratic
self-government cannot explain the universal presence of numerus clausus in
property systems.
243. Dagan elaborated on this account in a later work. See HANOCH DAGAN,
PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 33-35 (2011) [hereinafter DAGAN, PROPERTY]
("In property as institutions the numerus clausus principle... is understood as a
means for facilitating stable, and thus necessarily a limited number of, categories of
human interaction.").
244. Dagan, supra note 28, at 1565.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1567 ("Limiting the number of property forms and standardizing their
content facilitates the roles of property in consolidating expectations and expressing
ideal forms of relationship.").
247. DAGAN, PROPERTY, supra note 243, at 33.
248. Dagan, supra note 28, at 1563.
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navigating within certain property-exchange-relevant
relationships. 249 The main thrust of Dagan's claim concerns the
practical implication of this type of thinking.250 The consequence of
this account, Dagan holds, is that when faced with the task of
regulating the forms or identifying the interests created by an
ambiguous conveyance, judges must "reason from the social purpose
of the form."251
However, as an explanation of numerus clausus, Dagan's account
suffers from a set of challenges. First, Dagan's thesis is vulnerable to
the same uniqueness critique as the information-cost thesis. If it is
the case that default forms of interest serve to facilitate social good
in the context of property, why does the same principle not apply in
the context of contract?
In both contexts, parties come together to create and transfer
interests in a manner that is backed by the force of law. In both
cases, material aspects of our social practices are reflected in the
most common forms these transfers assume. For example, the
property form of a life estate reflects the common concern that a
loved one should be cared for until her death. Similarly, common
types of contracts (i.e., the personal service contract, the employment
contract) reflect material aspects of the employment relationship
and the personal service relationship. Yet, while there are some
restrictions imposed on the parties' capacity to customize certain
contracts (e.g., labor laws), there are no uniform restrictions on the
form that interests created under any contract can assume. If default
frameworks facilitate idealized forms of relationships in property,
why do we not impose default frameworks in the contract context as
well? In other words, why should we single out property law as a
vehicle for facilitating these normative ends but exclude contract
from the same category?
Moreover, Dagan's thesis fails to account for perhaps the most
salient feature of numerus clausus: the prohibition of novel forms.
Assuming that Dagan is correct that there is utility in creating a set
of default forms that serve to facilitate ideal relationships, it is not
clear why there should be a limited set of such "defaults."252 It is
249. DAGAN, PROPERTY, supra note 243, at 33.
250. Dagan, supra note 28, at 1566-67.
251. Id. at 1567.
252. Hansmann and Kraakman raise a similar point in the context of critiquing
the information-cost thesis. They observe, "[slo long as there are clear definitions and
labels for the forms most needed, the ability of parties to transact in those forms will
not be compromised by the availability of additional forms. Nobody need ever use
those additional forms, after all, or even utter their names." Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 24, at 381.
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true that some "defaults" will be more frequently used than others,
but why should uncommon forms of ownership be prohibited simply
because they are in less demand?
Dagan notes that parties to a property transaction may be able
to "contract[] around" the restriction on form-a capacity which
Dagan's treatment of numerus clausus would greatly expand-but
such an observation begs the question of the utility of requiring the
workaround in the first place. 2 5 3 It seems that the full utility and
function of Dagan's account of numerus clausus could be realized by
providing a wholly volitional set of suggested forms-a kind of
playbook of model conveyances (e.g., a set of model rules). In this
scenario, parties to the conveyance could choose to select a model
form from the playbook, or alternatively, to set out on their own and
customize the interests created by the conveyance. In either case,
Dagan's account of the utility and function of numerus clausus
would be equally served.
Thus, Dagan's principle contribution to the conversation
surrounding numerus clausus is the significant insight that common
forms of property often reflect material aspects of our social
practices, and that the existence of these forms can facilitate
idealized forms of certain relationships. 254 However, as an
explanatory account of numerus clausus, Dagan's account fails to
resolve the uniqueness question and likewise fails to account for the
most functionally salient feature of numerus clausus: the prohibition
of novel forms of ownership.
b. Davidson's Mediation-of-Competing-Norms Thesis
In 2008, Nestor Davidson offered a well-reasoned and well-
received alternative explanatory account of the principle of numerus
clausus. 255 Davidson argues that "legal systems standardize property
law because regulating the variety of allowable forms provides
platforms onto which property law's competing social and political
goals can be engrafted onto private ordering."2 56
Davidson's account seeks to reconcile aspects of what he
perceived to be the two dominant accounts of the principle: (1) the
Merrill/Smith-Hansmann/Kraakman law and economics account,
which emphasizes structural elements of the principle (i.e., the
prohibition on novel forms); and (2) the property-forms-as-categories-
of-meaning position, which emphasizes the content of property forms
253. Dagan, supra note 28, at 1568.
254. DAGAN, PROPERTY, supra note 243, at 33-34.




as principally advanced by Dagan. 257 Rather than embracing either
of these, Davidson espouses a pluralist account of numerus clausus,
concluding that the principle's primary function is to serve as a
platform for mediating competing values such as autonomy,
efficiency, democratic values, and distributive justice.258
Davidson's principle insight is that the formal rigidity of the
forms of property provides a stable structural platform for
negotiating and contesting these competing values. 259 Furthermore,
the principle's tolerance for flexibility within the content of the forms
accommodates inherent tensions in these values as they are applied
in the context of property rights.260  Davidson contends,
"standardization facilitates the regulation of particular problems in
property in a more targeted manner than regulating on a system-
wide basis (as with, for example, unconscionability in contract
regulation)."261 Moreover, he notes that "resolving conflicts over a
myriad of competing priorities in property law has played out ...
largely within the confines of the forms." 26 2
As with Dagan's account, Davidson's account contributes a
significant descriptive richness to our understanding of property
forms. Davidson's insight that the forms can serve as an arena of
contestation within the larger project of regulating property is well
taken. 263 However, as an explanatory theory of numerus clausus,
Davidson's account faces some challenges.
The first difficulty with Davidson's account as an explanation of
the persistence of numerus clausus in property doctrine has to do
with nexus between property forms the negotiation of the competing
values that Davidson identifies. Although it is true that when courts
alter rules regarding the parameters of a particular form, competing
values are reprioritized. A rule which says that a Right of Entry is
inalienable inter vivos may be understood to be an inefficient rule
(i.e., greater alienability of land increases the efficient use of that
resource). When a court changes that rule (i.e., allowing
alienability), the value of efficiency is renegotiated and given a
higher priority.
Yet, this phenomenon is equally at work any time a property rule
(or any rule of law) is renegotiated. When, for example, in the
257. Id. at 1599.
258. Id. at 1600-01.
259. Id. at 1653.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1654.
263. Id. at 1653 ("[A form] provides a relatively stable point of focus around
which changes in meaning and content can be negotiated.").
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context of adverse possession, a court rules that an owner must have
actual knowledge of a small encroachment (thereby changing the
previous rule and making it more difficult to gain adverse possession
of a small piece of land), the values of efficiency, equity, and
distributive justice that are implicated by the rule are reordered.
Thus, contesting, expressing, and prioritizing competing values
occurs outside the context of property forms as meaningfully as it
does within the context of property forms.
Further, Davidson points to general regulatory rules-such as
the prohibition against unconscionability in contracts-as a contrast
to property law's preference to resolve conflicts via the forms. 264
However, property law also employs broad regulatory rules. The
common law rule against perpetuities (and its various statutory
analogues), antidiscrimination rules, rules prohibiting trespassing,
rules of intestate succession, and rules that deny enforcement to
conditions on use or ownership that violate public policy, morality, or
rationality265 -all of these reflect a broad regulatory model that is
entirely independent of the forms.
More significantly, it is within these broad regulatory contexts
that the most serious and contentious battles among competing
values are played out. For example, in the context of the important
and (at one time) exceedingly prevalent problem of racial
discrimination in housing, the arenas of contestation turned out to
be constitutional challenges to restrictive covenants,266 the judicial
reinterpretation of Reconstruction Era legislation (i.e., Section
1982),267 and the adoption of new federal statutory law (i.e., the
Federal Housing Act).2 6 8 The forms neither played a role in that
negotiation nor acted as a primary (or even secondary) locus of the
conflict.
Similarly, virtually all of our most important and deeply
contested property-related issues (i.e., riparian rights, the extent of
copyright protections, the content of patent protections, the
perimeters of the "public use" doctrine in takings, the right to
cultural property, and so forth) are negotiated and renegotiated on
264. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1653.
265. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (ruling the enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants violates the 14th Amendment).
266. Id. at 21-22.
267. In 1968, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was reinterpreted by the Supreme
Court to bar all racial discrimination in the sale and rental of property. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1866); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
268. See generally Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631




platforms that have nothing to do with property forms. Thus, while
as a descriptive matter the forms, like all legal rules, may sometimes
serve as the locus of contests among competing values, they do not
serve as the sole or even primary locus of such contests in property
law. Like other doctrinal areas, property law appears to rely
primarily upon broad regulatory rules for renegotiating contested
values. It follows that the forms' capacity to serve as arenas for such
conflicts is unlikely to explain their existence in property law.
Moreover, Davidson's account encounters a second challenge
insofar as it is also unable to explain the principle's unique presence
in property doctrine.269 Assuming-as may well be the case-that
property forms facilitate the negotiation of pluralistic values, it is
not clear why the standardization of interests would not yield
similarly positive results in other doctrinal areas. Why do we only
apply numerus clausus in property law?2 7 0
Finally, as with Dagan's thesis, Davidson's thesis does not
explain the prohibition on novel forms. Assuming that the forms aid
in negotiating pluralistic values, it is not clear how the principle's
prohibition of novel forms of ownership advances this function. It
seems to follow that various forms of ownership could continue to
serve as platforms for negotiating competing values in the absence of
the prohibition of new forms. The concomitant enforcement of novel
or unusual forms of ownership would not seem to undermine the
availability of common or core forms of ownership for use as arenas
of contestation.
B. Lessons from the Fray: Compatibility, Uniqueness, and
Universality
Having considered several prominent explanatory theses of
numerus clausus, at this point it may prove useful to collect and
reflect upon some points of synthesis. A few broad points are
revealed by engagement with the information-cost thesis and its
various rejoinders. First, although each of the theses considered
above offers a novel explanatory account of numerus clausus, as a
descriptive matter these accounts are not mutually exclusive.
Importantly, most of the descriptive insights are entirely compatible
with the complexity thesis advanced here.
Second, the complexity thesis advanced herein does a better job
than the preceding explanatory accounts of accounting for the
salient features of numerus clausus, which are: (1) the prohibition of
269. See generally Davidson, supra note 19.
270. See Hansnann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 380.
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novel forms, (2) the principle's universality, and (3) its unique
application in property law. Each of these ideas is considered below.
1. Compatibility
Although each of the explanatory accounts of numerus clausus
considered above paints a slightly different descriptive picture of the
principle, these descriptive accounts are not mutually exclusive.
Merrill and Smith's account understands the principle to reduce
certain kinds of information costs. 27 1 Hansmann and Kraakman
believe that numerus clausus functions to facilitate the verification
of property interests. 272 Dagan understands numerus clausus to
provide convenient default frameworks for expressing and contesting
social meaning within the context of ownership. 273 Finally, Davidson
thinks that the primary function of the principle is to mediate
competing public norms in the context of ownership. 274
While each of these theses is insufficient as an explanation of the
principle (as discussed above), these theses could, nonetheless, all be
descriptively true. It could be the case that numerus clausus reduces
some information costs, facilitates verification, constitutes forms
that reflect social realities, and mediates conflicting norms.
Each of these descriptive pictures of numerus clausus is also
largely consistent with the complexity thesis. While the battle
against complexity best explains the salient features of numerus
clausus-the principle's prohibition of novel forms, its universality,
and its uniqueness-the principle could also (if secondarily) succeed
in serving many, or all, of the functions ascribed to it by other
theorists.
2. Explanation of Salient Features
As detailed above, other explanatory accounts of numerus
clausus fail to adequately account for all of the salient features of the
principle. Nonetheless, engagement with these theses illuminates
some important aspects of the questions that surround the
principle's three salient features (i.e., universality, prohibition of
novel forms, and uniqueness). Insofar as the adequacy of an
explanatory thesis can be measured by its capacity to account for
these features of the principle, a consideration of these questions
271. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 8.
272. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 374.
273. Dagan, supra note 28, at 1520.
274. Davidson, supra note 19, at 1650.
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may prove helpful in shedding light on important aspects of the
complexity thesis.
a. Universality and Form-Prohibition
Functional explanatory accounts of numerus clausus abound
largely because of the persistent and vexing question concerning the
"overriding structural reason" for the principle's universal presence
in post-feudal property systems. 275
Yet, it is important to be clear that when we refer to numerus
clausus in this context, we are referring specifically and inevitably to
the principle's prohibition of novel forms. It is this feature that is
universal. Our particular forms, our particular interpretation of the
criterial limits on those forms-these nuances are, of course, not
universal. Thus, explanations that fail to account for the principle's
prohibition on forms necessarily likewise fail to account for its
universality. When we are engaged with questions of the principle's
universality, we are directly interrogating why all property systems
(both historically and cross-culturally) prohibit novel forms.
The complexity thesis provides the most comprehensive (and
parsimonious) response to this question, positing that form-
prohibition is necessitated by the complexity that is inherent in our
interactions with objects in the material world. 2 76 In this way, the
complexity thesis provides the only necessary and ontological
connection between the application of the principle and the
ownership of tangible objects. The complexity thesis thereby
provides a better explanation for the principle's universality.
b. Uniqueness
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, accounting for
numerus clausus' unique application in property doctrine is not a
simple matter. Contract law provides a natural analogue, but many
scholars have had difficulty distinguishing property interests from
contract interests in a manner that makes use of numerus clausus.
One of the thorniest problems with distinguishing contract law
in this context is the fact that there does not seem to be a structural
feature of either contract or property law that uniquely insulates a
party from the risk that her interests are limited by a restriction or
condition that she does not know about and that is external to the
immediate transaction. In both the contract and property context,
275. Id. at 1600.
276. This is described in greater detail infra Part III.
[Vol. 81:79126
COMPLEXITY IN PROPERTY
this scenario may arise when a party to the contract (or conveyance)
has a lesser interest than she purports to convey. A property party's
risk seems to be commensurate with the contract party's risk in this
regard. If numerus clausus mitigates this risk in the context of
property, we would expect to see a rule of standardization likewise
applied to contract interests.
Similarly, both a party to a contract and a party to a conveyance
seem to enjoy reasonably commensurate access to information about
their respective rights. If anything, the property assignee is in a
better position than the contract party to access information
relevant to the scope of her interest. Property law provides a
systematic means of discovering information regarding the scope of
the interest that the transferring party purports to be transferring
(e.g., recording acts, chattel registries). 277 Property also creates
incentives to make use of the recording system to investigate the
scope of one's rights (e.g., rules often tie the priority of interests to
recording).278 In contrast, there is generally no recording or registry
system in place to assist a party to a contract in determining
whether her rights under the contract may be limited by prior
independent obligations assumed by the other party. Therefore, a
party's capacity to access relevant information about her interests
cannot serve as a metric for distinguishing contract interests from
property interests.
However, the complexity thesis offers an account of numerus
clausus' unique application in property doctrine that does not
depend upon distinguishing contract interests from property
interests in terms of either risk or access to information. Instead, the
complexity thesis posits that contract interests are distinguished
from property interests in terms of the sheer volume of information
that attends each. Because of certain ontological features that attend
owning tangible property (i.e., the duration of estates, the fact that
material objects transcend their estates, and the fact that property
interests are highly alienable), property interests have a unique
propensity to accumulate voluminous limiting contingencies and
conditions over long periods of time. Numerus clausus functions to
control the proliferation of these variables and thereby provides a
service that is necessitated by the problems that are uniquely
endemic to the context of property ownership.
The remainder of this Article is committed to explicating these
facets of the complexity thesis. A consideration of the epistemic
277. See generally POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 157, at 1045-58 (describing the
recording systems).
278. DUKEMINIER, ETAL., supra note 187, at 646-47.
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function of numerus clausus and the ontological features of property
ownership that necessitate the principle follows.
IV. NUMERUS CLAUSUS As ANTIHERO
Although the principle was initially described in this Article as a
hero, numerus clausus is most accurately described as an antihero.
It embodies well-known flaws and it presents a number of nettling
puzzles to those who seek to explain it. Yet numerus clausus also
succeeds in protecting us from the potentially catastrophic effect of
unbridled complexity. A consideration of the principle's role follows.
A. The Epistemology of Numerus Clausus
There has been much talk in the property literature about the
relationship between numerus clausus and the generation of
knowledge about property interests. 279 Most of the attention directed
at this issue has assumed the form of criticism directed at the
information-cost thesis. 280 Therefore, until now, the primary
framework for thinking about the relationship between numerus
clausus and knowledge generation has centered on the degree to
which the principle either makes information about property rights
more accessible (thereby reducing information costs), 2 81 or
alternatively, categorically eliminates certain kinds of uncertainty
with respect to property rights2 82 (thereby reducing information
costs).283
However, the thesis advanced here holds that each of these
framings misconstrues the primary function of numerus clausus.
The primary function of numerus clausus is epistemic in nature-
but its function is not to make information more accessible or
categorically eliminate certain kinds of uncertainty. Instead, the
primary epistemic function of numerus clausus is to render property
interests comprehensible by controlling the complexity that is
inherent in our normative interactions with tangible objects in the
world.
279. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 374 (disagreeing with
Merrill and Smith on the principle's effects on knowledge).
280. See, e.g., id.
281. See, e.g., id. (arguing that numerus clausus does not reduce measurement
costs).
282. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 28, at 1025 (arguing that numerus clausus
tolerates a great deal of uncertainty with respect to property interests).
283. See, e.g., id. (restating Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith's assertion that
simplification could arguably lower information costs).
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The principle achieves this goal by controlling the proliferation of
variables. 284 In this way, numerus clausus protects us from
complexity's capacity to overwhelm us with relevant information.
Additionally, the criterial control that numerus clausus exercises
over the forms of ownership provides a guide to distinguishing
information that is material about property interests from
immaterial information. Through this mechanism, numerus clausus
protects us from complexity's destructive obscuring capacity.
Numerus clausus exercises criterial control over the content of
conditions placed on property-a regulatory feature that is often
underestimated-but it still permits a fairly robust degree of
contingency with respect to those conditions. Our consideration of
epistemic-based criticisms of numerus clausus has revealed that the
principle does seem to succeed in substantially reducing information
costs to third parties (and to remote grantees) in much the way that
Merrill and Smith originally predicted. 285 By exercising its criterial
control over forms and by disallowing highly idiosyncratic property
interests, numerus clausus succeeds in eliminating an infinite
number of (otherwise) possible ownership arrangements. The
absence of these arrangements means that third parties (and remote
grantees) do not need to investigate these possibilities.
At first blush, this thesis may seem strikingly similar to Merrill
and Smith's information-cost reduction thesis. After all, reducing the
overall volume of information is a form of information-cost reduction.
Thus, the thesis presented here might be fairly characterized as a
refinement of Merrill and Smith's broader claims. Yet the complexity
thesis departs from the information-cost thesis in that it makes no
claims at all about efficiency. 286 The thesis advanced here allows
room for skepticism that numerus clausus leads to "optimal" forms,
an optimal number of forms, or that it otherwise meaningfully
reduces information costs beyond the function of controlling a worst-
case scenario of variable proliferation.
In this sense, the thesis presented here is sympathetic to the
concern that the principle of numerus clausus is in some ways poorly
suited to the broader task of reducing information costs associated
with property interests. The complexity thesis leaves room for the
criticisms that numerous clausus does a poor job of facilitating low-
cost access to information (i.e., notice), that it does a poor job of
eliminating contingencies, and that forcing parties to use recognized
284. While Merrill and Smith have suggested that this is the epistemological
function of numerus clausus, the thesis offered here illuminates the specific
mechanics and content of that claim.
285. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 8.
286. Id. at 5-6, 38-40 (discussing the efficiency of numerus clausus).
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forms often seems to create at least as many information costs as it
solves.
Instead, the complexity thesis posits that whatever information-
cost function that numerus clausus serves is a derivative of its
primary function. The primary function of numerous clausus is to
avoid a worst-case scenario: a property system that is completely
overwhelmed by relevant information. In this light, complexity
presents a problem that is distinct from-even if fairly categorized
as a subset of-more broadly generalizable efficiency concerns.
Controlling complexity is a very specific and very circumspect
function. At the same time, it is a function that is best realized with
an especially blunt tool-i.e., a tool that is insensitive to efficiency
and other distributive concerns. So, although numerus clausus
seems to be a poor fit for reducing information costs generally, if we
were to design a rule that sought only to control the complexity that
is inherent in our normative interactions with material objects in the
world, numerus clausus would be a very good fit.
Numerus clausus controls complexity in two ways. First, it
controls the overall proliferation of variables in the context of
ownership by categorically prohibiting a potentially infinite set of
ownership interests. In a world in which property rights are
infinitely customizable, the sheer number of variables that would be
relevant to ascertaining our property rights would be so
overwhelming as to defeat our capacity to process them. Second,
numerus clausus exercises criterial control over categories of
ownership, which serves as a guide to distinguishing material
information from immaterial information. Each of these functions is
considered in turn below.
1. Variable Constraint
Numerus clausus' primary function is to control the proliferation
of variables. We have already uncovered, within the preceding
discussion, the principal mechanisms by which it achieves this end.
First, numerus clausus' prohibition on novel forms succeeds in
eliminating highly idiosyncratic forms of ownership. Additionally,
numerus clausus' criterial control over the forms of ownership
succeeds in grounding (within criterial limits) the kinds of conditions
that can be placed on ownership. With these two tools, numerus
clausus protects us from the overwhelming complexity that would
otherwise render our property interests incomprehensible.
Although the principle fails to answer conveyance-specific
questions about restrictions (and thereby resolve those specific
contingencies), the principle does succeed in eliminating (by
rendering immaterial) whole classes of contingencies. The utility of
this function is perhaps best illustrated by a metaphor in which a
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potentially idiosyncratic condition on ownership is a "needle" in the
haystack of variables that relate to ownership. Numerus clausus
neither categorically eliminates the needle, nor does it specifically
identify the location of the needle. Instead, numerus clausus goes a
long way towards eliminating the haystack.
To illustrate these ideas, it is helpful to return to my
hypothetical purchase of a car from the New England Patriots fan.
In the hypothetical, the New England Patriots fan wants to sell her
car to me but imposes several conditions upon my ownership. Among
these conditions is the seller's right to use the car on the third
Sunday of every month that the Patriots scored a touchdown. The
hypothetical may seem fanciful, but this perception may owe more to
our (acculturated or deeply ingrained, depending on your
perspective) expectations regarding ownership than it does about the
example itself. Whether our centuries-old property rules have
constituted our concept of "ownership," or alternatively, our rules
simply reflect that concept, our concept of "ownership" excludes
these types of byzantine arrangements.
Yet we could easily imagine otherwise. We could regard our
normative commitments vis-A-vis tangible objects in the world to be
comprised of nothing more than a successive string of personal
commitments-that is, of contracts. Instead of conveying the right of
possession, we could exchange promises to surrender property to one
another under specified conditions. Under such a system, it would
make sense to highly customize those promises so as to maximize
the use of objects.
Additionally, if we were to rid ourselves of the very concept of
"ownership" and all of the normative commitments and status-based
social connotations that attend the concept, we would be left with a
very different way of interacting with objects in the world. Rather
than buying a car, I might enter into a "timeshare" contract so that
my expenses with respect to my use of the car are more carefully
calibrated to my actual use of the vehicle. Similarly, I may lease
rather than buy furniture (or clothes) on a weekly or even daily basis
so as to avoid the nuisance and expense of maintaining those objects
(i.e., cleaning the furniture or doing the laundry). It may well be the
case that my commitments vis-A-vis objects in the world would
become much shorter-term-a flexibility that would allow me to
quickly adapt to changing circumstances-while synthetic objects in
the world would themselves become much more disposable.
Moreover, it seems likely that given plenary power to construct
the right to use a given object, a purveyor of that right might be
inclined to introduce significant contingencies into these short-term,
flexible contracts. I might, for example, wish to sell the right to use
my car, but only if my new carpool works out. If I had unfettered
power to customize, I could transfer the right to use my car until
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such a time as I change my mind. In the present used automobile
market, I would likely have trouble finding a buyer with such a
lingering uncertainty burdening title to the car. But if all cars were
subject to similar sets of personal commitments (and I priced my
offer appropriately) I would likely find a taker.
It is not hard to see how within such a system there would be
significant incentives to enter into highly idiosyncratic agreements
about objects in the world. It is equally apparent that discerning at
any given moment who has the right to use a particular object-and
more importantly, the scope of the right to use-would be
challenging. In such a situation, we would begin to see that some of
the difficulties that occur in the context of complex derivatives also
arise in the context of every tangible object that we use or wish to
use. Even assuming that perfect notice of these contractual
obligations was possible, as is largely the case with derivatives, one
would have to process an overwhelming amount of information in
order to understand the scope of obligations concerning objects. The
problem would not be one of access to relevant information. Instead,
the problem would be the sheer volume of relevant information that
must be brought to bear on questions of value and risk in the context
of tangible objects.
Thus, the imagined scenario would differ from our present
property system in many ways, two of which are particularly
important. First, there would be a potentially infinite number of
types of property arrangements. Every promise could be novel,
thereby constituting its own category of property arrangement. In
other words, every token would likewise be a type. This fact alone
imports an intolerable number of variables into a decision to use an
object. We would not be able to meaningfully generalize about car
ownership, as each ownership arrangement would be distinct from
all others. We would not be able to easily and intuitively identify
(i.e., without a lot of time spent analyzing a vast amount of
variables) the salient features of car ownerships. In fact, there would
be no generally salient features. The materiality of a particular
feature of "car ownership" would turn on the specific obligations that
attend the use of a specific car.
Second, there would be no criteria for the enforcement of a given
type of ownership arrangement. There may, of course, be broad
criteria for the enforcement of all promises, as we already have in
the context of contract enforcement (i.e., there must be mutual
assent; unconscionable conditions are not enforced). But there would
not be criteria to help us delineate distinct categories-or forms-of
property arrangements. As a result, no arrangements would be
excluded (aside from those promises that violated the broad
proscriptions, such as unconscionability), at which point our analysis
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circles back to the first point: we are left with a potentially infinite
number of forms of "ownership."
Finally, in addition to its role as a novel-form eliminator,
numerus clausus serves as a guide to distinguishing relevant
information from irrelevant information. A consideration of the
mechanics of this epistemic function follows.
2. The Known Unknown
Herein we turn attention to those "weird" conditions and
"voluminous . . . restrictions" that Singer describes as complicating
our property arrangements. 287 Singer's point is that numerus
clausus does little to simplify our property arrangements insofar as
it tolerates these unpredictable and burdensome restrictions. 288 To
some extent, the criticism is accurate. Numerus clausus does
tolerate such restrictions, and those restrictions do increase
uncertainty with respect to property rights. However, numerus
clausus works to tame complexity in this context as well. The
principle provides a guide for distinguishing relevant information
from irrelevant information in the context of idiosyncratic
restrictions.
An illustration may prove helpful. Let us return for a final time
to the hypothetical of the New England Patriots fan's car. As
discussed previously, the arrangement is not permitted by numerus
clausus. However, let us assume that the Patriots fan altered the
agreement in light of numerus clausus to create a fee simple
determinable, granting the car to me "until the New England
Patriots score a touchdown." In this scenario, I am saddled with
considerable uncertainty with respect to the duration of my use of
the car. I likewise have no control over the condition that might
trigger the end of my estate. However, because of numerus clausus'
criterial control over the category of "fee simple determinable," I
know that information about the future scoring of the Patriots is
material, even if I do not have access to that information. I also
know the degree to which it is material. The fee simple determinable
is actually quite inflexible, at least when compared to the plenary
flexibility that is possible with a customized property arrangement.
The triggering condition (i.e., the Patriots scoring a touchdown)
operates as a toggle: either it happens or it does not. If it does
happen, my estate ends.




Now compare this situation with the original ownership
arrangement that the seller sought to transact. Under that
arrangement, if the Patriots scored a touchdown, the seller reserved
the right to use the car or to opt to demand a fee from me. In this
scenario, the material information consists not only of the Patriots'
future scoring ability but also of the seller's future state of mind with
respect to the use of the car. Moreover, these variables interact with
one another. The seller's state of mind is only relevant if the Patriots
score a touchdown. Further, if this ownership arrangement is only
one of several arrangements that affect my interest in the car, I
might not be aware that the Patriots' scoring ability is material,
simply because I am overwhelmed with relevant information.
Here enters some of the more subtle antiheroism of numerus
clausus. The principle renders immaterial considerations of the
seller's state of mind. It transforms the contingent condition into a
toggle, such that I know the consequences of the condition even
though I do not know whether it will occur. In this way, numerous
clausus eliminates the materiality of whole categories of information
and highlights the materiality of other categories. It transforms
information that I do not know is material (or do not know the
degree to which it is material) into information that I know to be
material (even though I do not have access to the information).
Moreover, we might broaden our consideration of this
phenomenon across multiple classes of information that are relevant
to owning a car. Some information that is relevant to owning a car is
discernible from the object itself (e.g., the car's mileage) and as such,
it may be immediately available when I encounter a particular car
that I would like to buy. Numerus clausus does not affect my ability
to access or process this information. Similarly, there is some
information that might not be immediately accessible but that I
know is material by virtue of the nature of the object itself (e.g., the
accident history of the car). Numerus clausus does not affect my
ability to access or process this information.
However, when we reach the class of information that is
inaccessible because it involves a contingency, numerus clausus
eliminates a potentially obfuscating class of information. We could
describe this class of information as the "unknown unknown"-that
is, information that is inaccessible (because it depends upon a
contingency) and that I do not know is material (or the degree to
which it is material), either because I am overwhelmed with relevant
information about my interests in the car, or because the
consequence of the contingency itself is contingent. The application
of numerus clausus transforms "unknown unknown" information
into "known unknown" information.
In the absence of numerus clausus there exists a class of
information that is material to our evaluation of the risk of the
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transaction and to the value of the object, but because we are
overwhelmed with relevant information (or because the contingent
variables in our customized agreement interact with one another) we
remain unaware of the existence or degree of that information's
materiality. Numerus clausus moves this class of "unknown
unknown" information into the "known unknown" category.
In sum, the primary epistemic function of numerus clausus is to
control the overall volume of variables that are relevant to the value
of objects and the risks of ownership. The principle affects this end
by exercising its criterial control over the forms of ownership to
eliminate the highly idiosyncratic ownership arrangement and to
eliminate the category of "unknown unknown" information.
However, the complexity thesis must still contend with a final
challenge. An explanatory account of numerus clausus must be able
to account for the principle's unique application in property law.
That task is undertaken below.
B. The Ontological Phenomenon of Complexity in Property
Assuming, provisionally, that we allow that numerus clausus
functions to tame complexity in the context of our normative
interactions with objects in the world (and we likewise assume that
this function is important), we still must account for the fact that
numerus clausus is a unique feature of property law. When we
create a legally enforceable interest whether that interest is
characterized as a property interest or contract interest-it seems
likely that a commensurate degree of complexity follows. Why then
do we not standardize contract interests?
There are two answers to this question: a short answer and a
longer answer. The short answer is that property is uniquely
complex. The long answer is that when we stand in normative
relation to objects in the world, there are certain ontological features
of our interaction with those objects (and our interactions with one
another, vis-A-vis those objects) that produce mind-boggling
complexity. These features include: (1) the duration of estates, (2)
the transcendence of material objects, and (3) the highly alienable
nature of property rights. A consideration of these features follows.
1. Duration of Estates
To begin this analysis, it is helpful to recall our previous
consideration of "uniqueness" as a challenge to other explanatory
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theses.289 In the course of that discussion, it became clear that there
was no structural feature of property law that provided an
impediment (or, especially, a unique impediment) to accessing
information about property interests. In other words, insofar as it is
not uniquely difficult for people to learn about their property rights,
adequate notice is not the problem. Similarly, the risk undertaken
by a property grantee that his interest is circumscribed by a prior
commitment on the grantor's part is roughly commensurate with the
same risk that is undertaken by a party to a contract.
Yet despite the lack of a unique structural distinction between
contract and property law, there are notable differences between our
property practices and our contract practices that are bound up in
the ontological features of tangible objects. Among these is the fact
that an estate often has an indefinite termination date, while
contracts generally do not.
Similarly, interests in a particular estate are frequently assigned
dozens of times as Blackacre changes hands over the course of
sometimes hundreds of years-a situation that results in multiple
"remote" grantors and grantees who are significantly removed in
time, and presumably, in knowledge from the creation of the original
estate.290 In contrast, the assignment of interests under a contract
often (although not always) involves an original party to the
contract. Although multiple, generation-spanning assignments are
theoretically possible in contract law, they do not seem to be the
norm.291
The fact that estates can (and very often do) last a very long
time, and the fact that rights created by a given estate may be
assigned multiple times across multiple generations conspire to
make it more likely that the grantee will have more relevant
information to process than he would have were rights under the
estate not assignable, or, alternatively, if the duration of the estate
was shorter. In other words, the quality that distinguishes the two
situations is the potential complexity of the interests at hand.
Now, it is important to pause here and seriously consider what is
meant by "more" and by "complexity" in this context. Certainly, very
289. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 380.
290. See generally Ronald A. Hendrickson, The Hendrickson House: The Oldest
Stone House in America?, originally published in Swedish Colonial News, Volume 1,
Number 19 (Spring 1999), available at http://colonialswedes.org/forefathers-fam-profl
(serving as an example of an estate that changes hands over hundreds of years).
291. See generally Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, & Richard Zeckhauser, The
Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
91 (2000) (describing why real world contracts are less "complex" than certain
theoretical models would anticipate).
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"complex" contractS292 can, and do, exist. Often, in the context of
contracts, a voluminous amount of information is required to
determine the scope of the interests created by the contract. 293 But it
is much less often the case that a contract will bind multiple
generations of parties, each of whom can unilaterally add their own
contract terms to the terms negotiated by the original parties.
This is the case, however, with estates.294 Estates either have a
set durational end point (e.g., a term of years), a defeasible
durational end point (e.g., a fee simple determinable), or no end
point at all (e.g., fee simple absolute).295 A grantee who takes a fee
simple absolute that is unfettered by collateral obligations (i.e.,
servitudes) can, when she transfers her interests, transfer an
entirely new estate. She can grant another fee simple absolute, or
she can create a lesser estate.296
On the other hand, a grantee who takes an estate subject to
preexisting restrictions (either durational or qualitative) is bound by
those conditions. Grantees who take after him are assignees of the
original obligations created in the conveyance. 297 Yet, the grantee
can add his own restrictions to those already in place upon the
estate. 298 For example, a grantee who takes a fee simple
determinable can, during his tenure as owner, impose an easement
upon the estate that he holds. The next grantee will then take an
estate burdened both by a defeasible condition and by an easement.
As discussed previously, while the imposition of additional
restrictions does not necessarily cloud the issue of notice, it does
complicate the contours of the interest that the owner enjoys in the
estate. Over time, ownership conditions can become imposing, and
the amount of information required to ascertain the contours of the
estate can become voluminous.
It is important to note, too, that each successive owner (or
"assignee" to continue the contract analogy) that takes Blackacre
does so in unique circumstances and with unique purposes. Over the
long durational arc of an estate, the physical characteristics of the
land in question (as well as surrounding land) may change. Each
successive owner may have his own idiosyncratic plans for using and
enjoying the estate. Successive owners need not be united in purpose
292. See id. at 92.
293. Id.





298. See id. at 378-79.
2013]1 137
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
or in plans. Only the object itself (here, Blackacre) connects them to
one another.
In other words, a significant distinction between property and
contract involves what is referred to in property as the "chain of
title," but what we can consider here more loosely to be the "chain of
estate." Here, the concern is not just that inaccuracies as to the
nature of interests conveyed may accumulate or that each
subsequent owner is able to add a unique layer of variables to the
existing cohort of restrictions. The concern is that over time, the
volume of information required to understand property rights
significantly increases.
This situation would be greatly aggravated if each successive
owner was permitted to impose restrictions that were not subject to
the criterial control exercised by numerus clausus. If owners were
permitted to add highly idiosyncratic and circumstantially-driven
contingencies to land (and object) ownership, the degree of
complexity that attends ownership would increase exponentially.
Interests in Blackacre that are straightforward upon the creation of
an estate may be reduced to a tangled thicket of interacting
variables many generations later.
Another way to think about this distinction is to conceptualize all
the relevant information about an estate in Blackacre as a small
block of ice. Core information about the estate-e.g., information
about the physical parcel of land-is both relatively stable and
transparent. At the dawn of a new estate, this core of information is
poised at the top of a timeline with no end in sight. As the estate
moves through time, it travels through the hands of a string of
successful owners whose possession and use have the potential to
cause information relevant to the estate to "snowball." As the cluster
of information grows, access to any one piece of information becomes
obscured by the sheer volume of relevant information.
Now contrast this picture with its contract analogue. Contract
interests may be quite complex at their inception, but they are much
less likely to grow exponentially over the duration of the contract
term. It is also not likely that the duration of a contract term will
span multiple human lifetimes as is quite frequently the case in
property.299
Now, we may well pause here to wonder whether the durational
length of estates can be properly characterized as an ontological
feature of interacting with tangible objects in the world. After all, it
299. See generally Hendrickson, supra note 290 (serving as an example of a
property term that lasted several generations).
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seems that we could simply impose durational limits upon estates. 300
We could, for example, limit the duration of an estate to the lifespan
of the owner, thereby converting all property interests into life (or
lesser) estates.301
However, the fact that estates frequently have open-ended
durational limits is bound up in ontological facts about objects in the
world. Property interests are inherently in tension with other
adjacent interests, largely (but not exclusively) because land is
literally contiguous. Because land is contiguous, property interests
are typically reciprocal and interact with one another (e.g., your
right-of-way is a restriction on my estate). For example, suppose that
A subdivides a parcel into two lots: Blackacre and Whiteacre.
Suppose too that Whiteacre is completely landlocked. A grants
Whiteacre to B and also grants an easement across Blackacre. When
should the easement end? If the easement ends when B dies, then
the owners who succeed B in Whiteacre will be perennially beholden
to the successive owners of Blackacre. As a consequence of the
properties being adjacent, Whiteacre owners will forever be required
to negotiate (and renegotiate) with Blackacre's owners for access to
an egress.302 No "permanent" or enduring egress can be obtained,
despite the fact that the condition that necessitates the egress is
permanent and enduring.303 How would such a system fairly contend
with the inherent durational advantage that would issue from
ownership by a non-natural person (e.g. a corporation)?
Also, because land and other tangible objects often endure for
longer than a single lifespan (a point we shall return to below),
property interests are also inherently successive in nature.
Assuming we impose a lifetime durational limit on estates (such that
the interest evaporates at the death of the owner, as when a joint
tenant predeceases his cotenants), who is empowered to determine
who the successive owner will be?
These factors, which are endemic to our interactions with
tangible objects in the world, make it difficult to impose blanket
durational limits on property. Blanket durational rules would be
300. Durational limits for certain property interests have been suggested in
limited contexts. See Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some
Comments on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403, 1413-14
(1982) (proposing durational limits for certain servitudes).
301. See id.
302. Although, this is not a disagreeable proposition to all commentators. See id.
at 1413 (suggesting that holdout problems could be solved by "limiting servitudes to
a fixed duration which is understood by the parties at the outset and renegotiated
periodically").
303. But see id. (contemplating the periodic renegotiation of some servitudes).
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difficult to constitute in a way that promotes either the just
distribution or the best use of valuable resources given the
contiguous nature of real property and the reciprocal and adjacent
nature of property rights.
Finally, tangible objects in the world-particularly land-tend to
transcend the lifespan of an individual owner. The significance of
this fact in the context of complexity is considered below.
2. The Transcendence of the Material
A second reason why property transactions are uniquely
vulnerable to complexity has to do with the fact that objects in the
material world enjoy a physical existence that is independent of
their legal significance. Unlike the entities that are the subjects of
human interaction in other areas of legal regulation, like "wrongs" in
tort or "promises" in contract, objects in the material world
transcend the legally significant moment of "operational facts"-
indeed they transcend their legal narrative altogether.
Consider a well-built house-the Hendrickson House in
Wilmington, Delaware, for example. 304 The Hendrickson House was
built in 1690 by Johan Hendrickson as a wedding present for his
younger brother, Anders. 305 Originally, it was merely a gift from one
brother to another. The legally significant act of conveying the house
was bounded by the relevant legal criteria for perfecting a gift. The
act of conveying was also bounded in time. Once the gift was
perfected, the act of giving became irrevocable. 306 But the fact of the
house-the fact that it existed as a tangible object occupying space
in the world-stands outside of these legal constructs. Once
constructed, the house would continue to stand whether a gift was
perfected (it was) or not. Similarly, the house existed, whether Johan
gave the house to Anders (as he did) or whether he changed his mind
mid-construction and gave the house instead to his youngest brother
Matthias.307 Once created, the house became an entity that
transcended both the acts that constituted the perfection of a gift
and the parties to the gift.
Indeed, the house literally transcended the parties, outlasting
not only Johan and Anders but every person involved in the building
of the house-stone masons, carpenters, and so forth. The
Hendrickson House then proceeded to outlast Anders' children,
304. See id.
305. Id.
306. POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 157, at 413.
307. See Hendrickson, supra note 290.
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grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and everyone who ever knew
Anders' children or grandchildren or great-grandchildren.
The Hendrickson House not only endured the legally significant
moment of "giving" between the brothers but it also endured the
very system of government that gave significance to those acts. 308
The Hendrickson House endured a political revolution and inception
of two subsequent forms of government. 309 The house was nearly one
hundred years old before the system of government that presently
regulates its legal significance was finally put into place.310 The
Hendrickson House still stands today, some 323 years after it was
created.31' Over the course of the last three centuries, it has been the
subject of numerus ownership arrangements. 312 It was created in the
context of a conveyance between Johan and Anders, but the
existence-the material reality-of the house could hardly be said to
be confined by that context.
This remarkable transcendence is a unique feature of material
entities. What non-material subject of legal regulation has the
capacity to transcend not only the parties immediately affected by
the regulation, but potentially, the legal regime itself? The
regulation of property is uniquely complex, in part, because each of
our objects has the potential to become serially involved in a long
sequence of ownership arrangements. For each object, the sequence
of ownership arrangements can span vast amounts of time, which
can introduce a host of variables relating to changing circumstances
and involve a very large number of otherwise unconnected people.
Perhaps nowhere is this transcendence more plainly evident
than in the regulation of real property. Every inch of terra firma on
the planet is a matter of significance. There is perhaps no subject of
legal regulation that is more closely connected to basic human
survival than the regulation of physical space. Yet, each acre of land
transcends the context of any given ownership arrangement. A
parcel of land is neither constituted by, nor is it coterminous with,
an estate. Although the two are frequently conflated, objects of
property and the estates that are attached to them are two entirely
different entities.
To consider this, imagine if instead of a house, the Hendricks
brothers had been parties to a contract. The contract would have
been extinguished when it was executed, repudiated, or the contract








would have been completed once the act or omission constituting the
wrong was completed. In both instances, the brothers likely would
have outlived the object of regulation.
In other words, a promise and a wrong both happen, but a house
is. The Hendrickson House exists separately and apart from the acts
that gave rise to an estate (i.e., the act that manifested Johan's
intent to give; the act that manifested Anders' acceptance of the gift;
and the delivery of the deed). In contrast, while particular acts
constitute both a "promise" and a "wrong" (e.g., the act of striking
another person constitutes a "wrong"), once those acts transpire, the
"promise" and the "wrong" cease to exist outside the context of their
ongoing legal significance (i.e., a contract or a cause of action). Their
moment, in other words, is fleeting and does not lend itself to
successive participants. A house, however, remains a house before
the creation of the estate, during the estate, and after the
termination of the estate. The house endures because it is not
primarily or solely constituted by the acts that gave rise to the
estate.
This endurance means that the house will likely meet with
successive owners and even successive estates. Over time, the
likelihood that restrictions will proliferate increases. In other words,
the arc of the house's lifespan is long and it bends towards
complexity.
In addition to the duration of estates and the transcendence of
the material, there is a final attribute of property that likewise
renders it vulnerable to complexity: the highly alienable nature of
property interests. This quality is considered below.
3. The Highly Alienable Nature of Property Interests
The highly alienable nature of property interests provides a final
point of distinction between property interests and contract
interests. Although contract interests are often assignable, they are
assigned with much less frequency than property interests. In
property, assignments are the norm, given that the duration of
estates tends to span multiple generations.
With respect to the alienability of property interests, we might
be met with the objection (as we did in the context of discussing the
duration of estates) that this is an attribute of property ownership
that is synthetic rather than ontological. We could, the objection
might hold, render property interests less alienable if we constructed
our property rules differently.
However, the alienability of property interests is also bound up
in ontological facts about our interactions with tangible objects in
the world. Because property interests are poorly suited to blanket
durational rules, material objects tend to endure through time, and
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owners (at least human owners) are mortal, ownership of real
property is an exercise in finitude. These three attributes conspire to
ensure the necessity of property alienability. It follows that a
property interest is likely to acquire a series of unconnected
successful owners, and this likelihood renders property interests
more vulnerable to the destructive capacity of complexity.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, while excellent insights can be culled from the rich
exploration of numerus clausus that precedes this project, the
complexity thesis offers a more coherent explanation of all of the
salient features of numerus clausus. The complexity thesis accounts
for the principle's universal presence in property systems by
demonstrating that the enterprise of normatively interacting with
tangible objects in the world is inherently and uniquely complex.
In the absence of numerus clausus' prohibition of novel forms,
the duties and obligations that we create with respect to our
property interests would rapidly grow so complex that they would
overwhelm our capacity to understand and enforce our property
interests. In exercising criterial control over the forms of ownership,
numerus clausus "tames" the wild beast of complexity and thereby
makes it possible for us to stand in normative relation to objects in
the world.
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